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China's Foreign Currency Regime: The
Kagan Thesis and Legalification of the
WTO Agreement
M. Ulric Killion*
INTRODUCTION
"Softness controlling hardness" (xian feili sheng).'
The economy of the People's Republic of China (China) has
grown dramatically over the past decade; so much that China
now has a large trade surplus over the United States.2 Just
over ten years ago, in 1993, the United States imported $31.5
billion in goods and services from China and its trade deficit
was $22.7 billion.3 Seven years later, in 2000, the United States
imported $100 billion in goods and services from China result-
ing in a trade deficit of $88.8 billion.4 By February 2004, the
U.S. Department of Commerce announced that the U.S. trade
deficit had, in 2003, increased to a staggering $124 billion.5 The
* M. Ulric Killion, Visiting Professor of International Law, Shanghai International
Studies University, Shanghai, P.R.C. I would like to thank Rong Jin (Jinan Univer-
sity) for her initial reading and comments regarding the first draft. A special ac-
knowledgement is also owed to the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade for their pro-
fessionalism in the editing and publication of this Article.
1. See Sun Hianyun, A Brief Introduction About Taijiquan, China Tai-
jiquan.com, at http://www.chinataijiquan.com/en/en/sun/A%20Brief%20
Introduction%20about%Taijiquanl.htm.
2. See Dan Ackman, China Not the New Japan-Yet, Forbes.com (Sept. 2,
2003), at http://www.forbes.co12003/09/02/cx-da_0902topnews-print.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 15, 2004).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Robert E. Scott, Soaring Imports of Oil and Chinese Goods Drive Trade
Deficits to New Record, TRADE PICTURE (Econ. Pol'y Inst.), Aug. 13, 2004,
http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/webfeatureseconindicatorstradepict200408l3.
("China has refused to increase the value of its currency, which has expanded the
trade gap. China's intransigence has also made it more difficult for other Asian na-
tions to allow their currencies to rise.").
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Department of Commerce attributed the growth of the U.S.-
China trade deficit to China's pegged yuan.6
The controversy surrounding China's foreign currency ex-
change regime came to light long before the release of the 2004
Commerce Department Report. The issue of China's pegged
yuan comprised a large part of the debate, which surrounded
China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on
December 7, 2001. 7 As China's application to the WTO was put
under scrutiny by WTO members, the United States, and other
countries intensified their criticism of China's qualifications and
expressed displeasure that the Chinese yuan had been pegged
at about 8.28 since 1995,8 and had barely fluctuated since.9
6. See id. The Chinese government has prevented the price of its currency, the
"yuan," from fluctuating according to supply and demand, but rather it artificially
fixed the yuan's price at a certain level.
7. See WTO Ministerial Conference, Accession of the People's Republic of
China: Decision of 10 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) (entered
into force Dec. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Accession of China to WTO]; see also Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994).
8. See David DeRosa, Commentary: Pushing the Wrong Button on the Yuan,
INT'L HERALD TRIB.: THE IHT ONLINE, Oct. 13, 2003, http://www.iht.com/articles/
113420.html; see also 149 CONG. REC. 121, S11161 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 2003) (state-
ment of Sen. Schumer), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:S.
1586. Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The currency of the People's Republic of China, the yuan, is artificially
pegged at a level significantly below its market value. Economists estimate
the yuan to be undervalued by between 15 percent and 40 percent or an
average of 27.5 percent.
(2) The undervaluation of the yuan makes exports from the People's Repub-
lic of China less expensive for foreign consumers and makes foreign prod-
ucts more expensive for Chinese consumers. The effective result is a sig-
nificant subsidization of China's exports and a virtual tariff on foreign
imports, leading the People's Republic of China to enjoy significant trade
surpluses with its international trading partners. The United States trade
deficit with China has widened from $57,000,000,000 in 1998 to
$103,000,000,000 in 2002, resulting in an aggregate deficit with China of
over $396,000,000,000 for that 5-year period.
(3) China's undervalued currency and the United States trade deficit with
the People's Republic of China is contributing to significant United States
job losses and harming United States businesses. In particular the United
States manufacturing sector has lost over 2,600,000 jobs since March 2001,
which accounts for approximately 90 percent of the total United States job
losses.
(4) The Government of the People's Republic of China has intervened in the
foreign exchange markets to hold the value of the yuan within an artificial
trading range. China's foreign reserves are estimated to be over
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These countries charged China with thereby engaging in unfair
and discriminatory trade practices. 10
Despite enhanced market access of U.S. companies to
China's mainland market following China's accession to the
WTO, the U.S. trade deficit has not been reduced.11 As the 2004
Commerce Department Report indicates, the U.S. trade deficit
with China only continues to grow. In fact, the 2004 Commerce
Department report figures do not even account for sales of U.S.
affiliates in China. The report therefore underestimates the ac-
tual level of commercial engagement between China and the
United States. 12 Had the figures included sales of U.S. affiliates
in China with figures of sales by companies in the mainland
United States, the deficit would have been even larger. 13
This climate of growing U.S. deficits and shrinking U.S.
profits in its trade with China breeds potential problems be-
tween Washington and Beijing.14 Most disconcerting is that
$345,000,000,000 as of June 2003, and have increased at a level higher
than that of any other country.
(5) China's undervalued currency and the Chinese Government's interven-
tion in the value of its currency violates the spirit and letter of the world
trading system of which the People's Republic of China is now a member.
(6) The Government of the People's Republic of China has failed to
promptly address concerns raised by the United States and the interna-
tional community regarding the value of its currency.
(7) Article XXI of the GATT 1994 (as defined in section 2(1)(B) of the Uru-
guay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(1) (B)) allows a member of the
World Trade Organization to take any action which it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests. Protecting the United
States manufacturing sector is essential to the interests of the United
States.
Id.
9. See Ackman, supra note 2.
10. The charge against China is that a pegged yuan undervalues U.S. currency,
gives an unfair advantage to Chinese manufacturers at a cost of U.S. jobs, and in-
creases the U.S.-China trade deficit. See 149 CONG. REC. S11161 (daily ed. Sept. 5,
2003) (statement of Sen. Schumer); 149 CONG. REC. S.11187 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Lieberman); Asian Currencies: Fear of Floating, ECONOMIST, Jul.
10, 2003, http://www.economist.comfPrinterFriendly.cfm?Story-ID=1912021 ("[As
early as July 2003], John Snow, America's treasury secretary, the International
Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlements [had] all called for a
stronger yuan.").
11. See Joseph P. Quinlan, Ties That Bind, FOREIGN AFF., Jul./Aug., 2002, at
116-17.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.; see also White House Opposes Congressional Moves to Punish China,
tdctrade.com, at http://www.tdctrade.com/alert/us0323c.htm (last visited Sept. 15,
2004) (reporting that the punitive tariff measure proposed by Senator Schumer is
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U.S. politicians are failing to fully understand the dynamics of
U.S. - China trade relations and are mistakenly formulating a
unilateral protectionist backlash against China.15 Rather than
resorting to the multilateral WTO Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) to settle its qualms with China, the United States has
been influenced by domestic politics to make largely unilateral
and protectionist responses to China's acts.16 Election year poli-
faced with criticisms from U.S. trade associations that the sanction would violate the
United States's WTO commitments and could lead to a massive retaliatory tariff on
U.S. exports).
15. See Quinlan, supra note 11.
16. See Focus: Escalating Pressure on Yuan Revaluation, CHINA DAILY (H.K.
ed.), Nov. 4, 2003, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-11/04/content-
278165.htm [hereinafter Focus: Escalating Pressure on Yuan Revaluation].
September 1 - In his Labor Day speech, President Bush expresses his will-
ingness to push for the convertibility of some foreign currency.
September 2 - Treasury Secretary John Snow chooses to sit on the fence in
his IMF speech, saying a free-floating Yuan is good for China's central
bank and will help China's economy withstand both internal and external
shocks.
September 3 - UNITE, a union representing 250,000 apparel, textile, laun-
dry and distribution workers, announces a grassroots lobbying campaign to
slow the surge of Chinese imports.
September 5 - The US Senate passes Resolution 1586 to demand currency
negotiations with China within 180 days under threat of introducing sanc-
tions.
September 10 - House Resolution 3058 is proposed to curb what it terms
"China's currency manipulation". The Treasury Secretary is asked to as-
sess the situation and impose an additional tariff if necessary.
September 11 - A Senate hearing is held on US-China relations.
September 26 - Senate Resolution 219 is passed to encourage China to es-
tablish a market-based valuation of the Yuan.
October 1 - The House Committee on Financial Services discusses the open-
ing of China's financial market.
October 2 - Congress receives Bill 3328, which requests the revocation of
normal trade relations with China.
October 3 - The US-China Business Council issues its assessment of
China's WTO compliance.
October 16-17 -A House committee holds a hearing to discuss China's role
in the world economy and its trade commitments.
October 20 - The US Senate proposes Resolution 1758 asking the Treasury
Secretary to report on "China's currency manipulation".
October 21 - The US Congress holds a hearing on reassessing US-China
economic ties.
October 31 - the US Treasury Department report said that China is not
[Vol. 14:1
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tics in 2004 further exacerbated the extremity of U.S. protec-
tionism and unilateralism. 17
China itself has also been perpetuating hostilities between
the United States and China. Specifically, it has not been par-
ticularly accommodating toward steps taken by the United
States and other countries to negotiate the terms of its contro-
versial currency exchange rate. China has repeatedly heeded
the advice of these countries to float its rate only to quickly
change its position and return its currency to a peg. In 2003,
China agreed to abide by President Bush's request that China
float its exchange rate18 by announcing that it would indeed ad-
just China's exchange rate to a float. 19 On October 30th of that
year, China seemed to take further steps to fulfill its goal when
it announced that it would boost the value of the yuan by up to
fifteen percent in order to prevent its economy from overheat-
ing.20 China took further action by offering concessions to U.S.
manufacturers, such as increasing limits on how much a foreign
traveler can buy from banks, other capital control adjustments,
reducing subsidies or tax incentives to exporters, and agreeing
to buy U.S. Treasury bonds with dollars earned through the
trade surplus. 21 On March 3, 2004 however, China wound back
the clock by reverting to a pegged yuan. 22 China's currency re-
manipulating its currency to gain unfair trade advantages. However, Snow
said the Bush administration would continue to keep up its diplomatic
pressure on China to drop its tight peg to the dollar.
Id.
17. Id.; see also DeRosa, supra note 8 ("How is China supposed to have manipu-
lated-that is the term used in the U.S. Senate-the exchange rate when that rate
does not change? In Washington, it seems that anything flies if it helps win an elec-
tion.").
18. For general background information about U.S. manufacturers' lobbying
efforts against China's fixed currency exchange rate and President Bush's stance,
see generally Marc Benitah, China's Fixed Exchange Rate for the Yuan: Could the
United States Challenge it in the WTO as a Subsidy?, ASIL INSIGHTS, 1 1, (Oct.
2003), at http://www.asil.org/insights.htm.
19. See China to Revalue Yuan by 10-15%, FIN. EXPRESS, Oct. 31, 2003, at
http://www.financialexpress.comfefull-story.php?content-id=45167 [hereinafter
China to Revalue Yuan].
20. See id.
21. Ackman, supra note 2.
22. China Restates Policy on Keeping Yuan Rate, INT'L HERALD TRIB. at
http://www.iht.com/articles/508560.html ("China's central bank on Wednesday reaf-
firmed its policy of keeping the yuan's fixed exchange rate, a day after the U.S. Fed-
eral Reserve chairman, Alan Greenspan, warned that buying dollars to support the
peg might cause the economy to overheat."); China Has No Plan to Revalue Yuan
Soon, CHINA DAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com.cnlenglishldoc/2004-03/08/contenL
312672.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2004) ("Deputy governor Li Ruogu of the People's
2004]
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mains pegged to this day.
The U.S. - China trade dispute brings up a more dire issue
than whether the U.S. charges against China were justified. 23
At issue is that the unilateral approach taken by the United
States exceeded the parameters of an ordinary trade dispute
and has had far-reaching ramifications on the legitimacy of mul-
tilateral trade and the WTO regime.24 On the trade front, U.S.
actions exemplified by the U.S. dispute with China are starting
to parallel the growing U.S. unilateralism and hegemony in its
use of military force and in global politics. U.S. policymakers
must move away from this unilateralist model of international
trade relations in order to spare the future of U.S. relations with
the rest of the world, including China. 25
This Article explores the issue of the use of growing U.S.
unilateral power in the context of the China pegged yuan con-
troversy. Specifically, it analyzes the justification of the use of
unilateral acts in international relations according to the Kagan
Thesis. 26 The analysis focuses on the danger of U.S. unilateral
power vis-A-vis the Kagan Thesis and how it poses a threat to
and undermines the power and authority of the WTO and gov-
ernance of international trade. Finally it addresses how U.S.
unilateralism presages legalification (Verrechtlichung) of the
WTO agreement. 27
Part I of this Article addresses the issue of China's pegged
foreign currency exchange rate. Next, it explains the require-
ments for compliance with the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT 1947)28 and elaborates on the WTO provisions
Bank of China, the central bank, said on Sunday China has no plan to revalue the
yuan in the near future and believes the pegged currency is correctly valued.").
23. See DeRosa, supra note 8; 149 CONG. REC. 121, S11161 (daily ed. Sept. 5,
2003) (statement of Sen. Schumer), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bi/query
/z?c108:S.1586.
24. See Focus: Escalating Pressure on Yuan Revaluation, supra note 16.
25. See id.
26. See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER-AMERICA AND
EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 3 (Vintage Books 2004) [hereinafter KAGAN
THESIS]. The Kagan Thesis first appeared in Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness,
Why the United States and Europe See the World Differently, POL. REV., June/ July
2002, available at http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html.
27. For the definition of "legalification," see generally Symposium Program,
Erdgasliberalisierung in Osterreich (Sept. 26-27, 2002), available at
http://www.sattler.co.at/pdf/symposion.tagungsmappe.pdf (noting that legalification
(Verrechtlichung) is upgrading a mere agreement without legal quality to an au-
thoritative instrument of law) [hereinafter Legalification Definition].
28. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
[Vol. 14:1
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that proscribe consequences of unfair trade and unfair competi-
tion. Finally, Part I explains the Kagan Thesis, U.S.-China
trade policy, and the concept of legalification.
Part II of this Article analyzes the issue of the U.S. pursu-
ance of "hard" rather than "soft" globalization as arguably mani-
fested in its seemingly drastic and politically motivated re-
sponses to drops in value of the dollar.29 It also discusses U.S.
foreign policy in terms of "hard globalization"; activist trade pol-
icy; and the Kagan Thesis of unilateralism, if not Hobbesian
multilateralism. 30 In doing so, it juxtaposes U.S. unilateral poli-
cies, multilateral trade, and the WTO regime. This Article con-
cludes with a discussion of the growth of Kagan-thesis type tax-
onomy, causes of legalification, and resulting danger presented
to the future of multilateral trade, the WTO regime, and the
governance of international trade.3 1
I. THE CHINA-YUAN-CONTROVERSY AND GLOBAL TRADE
A. THE PEGGING OF THE CHINESE YUAN
The National Association of Manufacturers, the American
Farm Bureau, and the AFL-CIO are among the most vocal
American opponents of the pegged yuan.32 These and other
groups complain that the yuan's fixed peg undervalues U.S. cur-
rency by as much as forty percent .33 They argue that an under-
valued dollar in turn gives an unfair advantage to Chinese
manufacturers at the cost of jobs for American workers.34
The essence of the U.S. argument against a pegged yuan is
29. See, e.g., DeRosa, supra note 8; Focus: Escalating Pressure on Yuan Re-
valuation, supra note 16; Eric Denters, Manipulation of Exchange Rates in Interna-
tional Law: The Chinese Yuan, ASIL INSIGHTS, 3, (Nov. 2003), at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insighl18.htm.
30. See KAGAN THESIS, supra note 26, at 3-4.
31. See generally Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Types of Multi-Level Govern-
ance, CAHIERS EUROPEENS DE SCIENCES PO (Dept. Pol. Sci., U. N.C. at Chapel Hill),
June 2002, available at http://www.portedeurope.org/publications/cahiers/cahier_3
2002.pdf.
32. See Ben Craig & Owen Humpage, The Myth of a Strong Dollar Policy, 22
CATO J. 417, 417 (2003).
33. See 149 CONG. REC. 121, S11161 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Schumer); Benitah, supra note 18; U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REVIEW COMM'N,
2004 REP. TO CONGRESS, at 4, available at http://www.uscc.gov/researchreports/2004
/04/annual report.pdf.
34. See China to Revalue Yuan, supra note 19.
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that, by pegging the yuan to the dollar, China unfairly perpetu-
ates a comparative cost advantage it has over the United States
in the manufacturing sector.3 5 Comparative advantage theory
assumes that countries benefit by focusing on what they can
produce most efficiently. 36 In terms of global trade, efficient
scales of operations, and more customers, most companies real-
ize that the bigger the market, the greater their potential.37
Liberal trade, which fosters an unrestricted flow of goods, ser-
vices and productive inputs, multiplies rewards for companies
that produce the best products at the best prices.3 8 The latter,
however, is contingent on free trade operating without the con-
straint of protectionism. 39
U.S. allegations of Chinese protectionist practices arise
from observations that "[w]hen the dollar weakens against the
euro and the yen, the yuan also weakens by roughly the same
proportion."40 The effect of this parallel devaluation in currency
is that "U.S. consumers will not find Chinese-produced goods to
be any more expensive today" than before the devaluation oc-
curred.41 Under this scenario, many U.S. factories will close and
many U.S. jobs will consequently be lost, resulting in wide-
spread resentment against China.
Despite the diversity of groups in the United States that ar-
gue against the pegged yuan, their arguments are very simi-
35. See Richard N. Block, et al., Economic Perspectives on International Labor
Standards, 11 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 417, 419 (2002):
Traditionally, economists have referenced the "factor cost model" when dis-
cussing international trade. Specifically, the theory suggests that countries
should specialize in the production of goods in which they can produce at
least cost .... mheorists take into account a country's productive factor
endowments, including land, capital, labor and climate. In applying the
factor cost model, economists compare the costs of production of each prod-
uct both within and between countries. When a jurisdiction has the capa-
bility to produce a particular product at least cost compared to other juris-
dictions, it is said to have an "absolute advantage." Meanwhile, that
country is said to have a "comparative advantage" in a certain product if it
can produce that output cheaper relative to other products within its
boundaries.
Id.
36. See also WANG Yi, GATT & WTO-LAw AND RULES FOR WORLD TRADE 4-6
(Beijing Publishing House of Law 1998).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Marshall Auerback, The Economic Costs of American Imperialism, X5
JPRI CRITIQUE, 2 (Jun. 2003), at http://www.jpri.org/publications/critiques/critique
X_5.html.
41. Id.
[Vo1.14:1
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lar.42 One common argument is that the U.S. currency is weak-
ened due to large fiscal and trading deficits, which partially re-
sult from the pegged yuan.43 According to this argument,
pegged currencies of developing countries such as China do not
help alleviate deficits as do the euro and the yen, which have
"floating" exchange rates that are permitted to rise against the
dollar.44 Under this argument, a pegged Chinese yuan con-
versely contributes to a devalued dollar. 45
There are divergent views on whether China should float or
peg its foreign currency. The viewpoints include: (1) a viewpoint
that deems a float premature; (2) a separate viewpoint that rec-
ommends a float; and (3) another viewpoint that alters the peg
by a one-time revaluation. According to these viewpoints,
China's initial refusal to float its foreign currency exchange may
be justifiable.
Those who recommend that China should not yet float its
currency base their arguments on the problems emanating from
"China's underdeveloped financial sector, partially reformed
banking industry, and vulnerable state-owned enterprises."46
42. Samplings of other complainants regarding the Chinese yuan are organiza-
tions offering comments on relevant topics and issues for discussion in the working
group established at the April 21, 2004 meeting of the U.S.-Joint China Commission
on Commerce and Trade. See Transcript of Hearing, U.S.-China Joint Commission
on Commerce and Trade Working Group on Structural Issues, International Trade
Administration Import Administration, Department of Commerce (June 3, 2004), at
173, 187-88, available at http://ia.ita.doc/gov/download/us-china-jcctwg/hearing-
transcript-06-03-2004.pdf. Some of these organizations were the Specialty Steel In-
dustry of North America (SSINA) and the National Council of Textile Organizations
(NCTO). See Letter from the National Council of Textile Organizations, to the Hon-
orable James J. Jochum, Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, U.S. De-
partment of Commerce (May 19, 2004), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/
us-china-jcctwg/comments/ncto-jcctwg-cmt.pdf; Letter from the Specialty Steel In-
dustry of North America, to the Honorable James J. Jochum, Assistant Secretary for
Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (May 19, 2004), available at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/us-china-jcctwg/comments/ssina-cctwg-cmt.pdf.
43. See Jackie Horne, China Growth Controls Face Interest Rate Dilemma, Fi-
nance Asia, at http://www.financeasia.com/AllAuthors.cfm?Author=Jackie%20
Horne&email=jackie%2Ehorne%40fmanceasia%2Ecom (Dec. 16, 2003) (subscription
required to access site) (on file with author) (quoting Fitch Ratings China economist
Brian Coulton and reporting that other currencies need to rise against the dollar to
help manage the dollar's decline but only the euro and the yen are sharing in the
burden of the dollar's weakness, not the yuan or the won).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Jennifer Chang & Rod Tyers, Trade Reform, Macroeconomic Policy and Sec-
toral Labour Movement in China, AUSTL. NAT'L U. WORKING PAPERS IN ECON. AND
ECONOMETRICS No. 429, at 25 (Aug. 2003) (internal footnote omitted), available at
http://ecocomm.anu.edu.au/research/papers/pdf/wp429.pdf; see also Carol Graham,
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The banking industry is currently undergoing reforms and its
problems affect the economy as a whole. Moreover, it suffers
from deep-rooted problems such as low degree of commercializa-
tion, distorted incentives, high ratio of bad loans, government
ownership, inefficient management, and other problems.47
China wishes to keep its foreign exchange rate pegged because
the relaxation of capital controls or exchange rate is thought to
further weaken the Chinese economy, 48 and to create a risk of
large-scale capital outflows and sharp currency depreciation in
response to bad news from China's banking and economic sec-
tor.49 The Chinese choose to ignore recommendations to float
the exchange rate and keep it pegged,50 because they believe
that an acceleration of reforms would be more beneficial to
China's economic growth than if they were to float the rate. 51
The second view regarding China's currency is that China
should float rather than peg its currency. The significance of
this viewpoint in light of China's accession to the WTO concerns
China's integration into the international trade regime and to
what extent China should control its capital flows, foreign direct
investment (FDI), and exchange rate volatility.52 Supporters of
Strengthening Institutional Capacity in Poor Countries: Shoring up Institutions, Re-
ducing Global Poverty, BROOKINGS INST. POLICY BRIEF No. 98, at 3-4 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/comm/policybriefs/pd98.pdf.
47. See Yi Gang, China's Accession to the WTO and the Opening and Reform of
Financial Services, in CHINA: ACCESSION TO THE WTO AND ECONOMIC REFORM 209
(Wang Mengkui ed., Foreign Language Press Beijing 2002).
48. See Chang & Tyers, supra note 46, at 21, 22-25.
49. See Morris Goldstein, Adjusting China's Exchange Rate Policies, INST. INT'L
ECON. WORKING PAPER No. WP-04.1, at 45 (2004), available at http://www.iie.com
/publicationswp/2004wpO4-1.pdf.
What makes the Snow proposal inappropriate for China's present circum-
stances is the still fragile state of the Chinese banking system .... Given
the unhappy experience of many of its neighbors during the Asian financial
crisis, China is understandably reluctant to risk repeating that outcome.
Instead, it would rather phase-in the liberalization of its capital account
according to the progress made in strengthening the banking system.
Id.
50. While Chang and Tyers maintain that "China's macroeconomic policy re-
gime has reduced economic performance relative to its theoretical potential," they do
not "advocate the immediate elimination of capital controls and the adoption of a
floating exchange rate." See Chang & Tyers, supra note 46, at 25.
51. See id.; DEPT. OF TREASURY, REP. TO CONGRESS ON INT'L ECON. EXCH. RATE
POLICIES (2004), 8-9, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/jsl335.htm (hereinafter
2004 REP. TO CONGRESS ON INT'L ECON. EXCH. RATE POLICIES) ("Since 1994, when it
unified its exchange rates and adopted its current pegged exchange rate system, the
Chinese economy has grown rapidly, as has China's participation in world trade.").
52. See Yin-Wong Cheung et al., The Chinese Economies in Global Context: the
Integration Process and Its Determinants, U. CAL. SANTA CRUZ CTR. FOR INT'L ECON.
[Vo1.14:1
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this viewpoint base their argument on a statistical study, which
suggests that China's financial and real integration with the
rest of the world is contingent upon FDI and exchange rate vola-
tility. According to this view, it is therefore likely that China
will move, at least in the intermediate run, towards a floating
rate, rather than maintaining a pegged rate.53
A third view recommends a one-time revaluation of the
yuan, with an appreciation of twenty to twenty-five percent. 54
Supporters of this view assert that a one-time revaluation will
convert China's global account surplus into a manageable defi-
cit, readily financed by foreign direct investment (FDI) and pri-
vate capital. 55 They do not recommend floating, and opening of
capital accounts, due to needed reforms in the banking sector
and the Asian financial crisis. 56.
B. THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF WTO STANDARDS
The WTO administers multilateral trade rules. The under-
lying philosophy behind multilateralism is the idea that a com-
bination of open markets, non-discrimination, and global compe-
tition creates conditions that are most conducive to the national
welfare of all nations.57 Conversely, unilateralism, which is syn-
onymous with Hobbesian multilateralism,58 is characterized by
minimal consultation and involvement with other nations. 59
Unilateralism emphasizes the right of sovereignty-the right of
PAPER No. 03'16, at 19-21 (June 16, 2003), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org
/sccie/03-16.
53. Id. at 21.
54. See C. Fred Bergsten, Speeches, Testimony, Papers: The Exchange Rate of
the Won, Institute for International Economics, at http://www.iie.com/publications
/papersbergstenlOO3-2.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2004); see also Alexander S.
Dumke et al., The China Energy Market: Risk Analysis, U. SYDNEY. CTR FOR INVL
RISK, at 10 (Nov. 2002), at http://www.econ.usyd.edu.au/download.php?627 (refer-
ring to the yuan as "the renminbi").
55. See Bergsten, supra note 54.
56. See id.
57. See Moana Bhagabati, Regionalism vs. Multilateralism Debate, HINDU Bus.
LINE, at 5, Mar. 28, 2001, http:Ilblonnet.com/2001/O3/28/stories/O42820mo.htm.
58. See Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, '9-11.: Globalization, Security, and World
Order, DANISH INST. OF INT'L AFF. WORKING PAPER No. 2002/2, at 17-21 (2002),
available at http://www.dupi.dk/webdocs/wp2002O2.pdf (discussing the relationship
between a "Hobbesian moment" and "ontological insecurity").
59. Nicholas Berry, The Many Sources of U.S. Unilateralism, Center for De-
fense Information Asia Forum, at http://www.cdi.org/asia/fa0813O1.html (Aug. 13,
2001) ("Unilateralism can be defined as a process of policy making within a tight
group of national decision makers who disregard foreign perspectives and thus pro-
duce policies serving narrow national interests.").
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a nation to select policies as determined by individual prefer-
ences and situational exigencies. 60
The multilateral-unilateral dichotomy is addressed by the
WTO rules. WTO rules do not prescribe free trade. Rather,
various substantive and procedural norms prescribe a code of
conduct that makes trade a multilateral issue.6 1 The WTO
trade regime has a multilateral rule-oriented, rather than re-
sults-oriented, approach to international governance of trade.62
The WTO's multilateral rule-oriented approach is highlighted by
the principle that countries should conduct trade on a non-
discriminatory basis. This principle is embodied in the Most
Favored Nations (MFN) clause and the national treatment obli-
gation.6 3 The non-discrimination and economic equality norms
of MFN treatment require member countries to give equal treat-
60. Erik Beukel, Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism: The International Political
Economy of the Trade/Environment Nexus, INST. OF INT'L RELATIONS, U. OF B. C.
WORKING PAPER No. 22, at 3, available at http://www.iir.ubc.ca/pdffiles/
webwp22.pdf.
61. Id. at4.
62. Id.
63. GATT 1947, supra note 28, art. I (outlining most favored-nation treatment).
The principle of national treatment under Article III prohibits internal taxes and
other internal measures that discriminate against imports. GATT 1947, supra note
28, art. III. This obligation requires that countries treat foreign goods no less fa-
vorably than equivalent domestically produced goods. Id.; see also JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & WTO-INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 57-58 (Cambridge University Press 2002).
Trade without discrimination is embodied in the most-favoured-nations
clause, at GATT 1947 article I, providing that trade must be conducted
based on non-discrimination, and the national treatment article, at GATT
1949, article III, National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation,
requiring that once goods enter a market they must be treated no less fa-
vorably then equivalently domestically produced goods (Disguised protec-
tion also prohibited). However, more particularly, the rules concerning fair
trade and fair competition, generally, address dumping, subsidies and
countervailing duties.
Id.
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method
of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and for-
malities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect
to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advan-
tage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or des-
tined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
GATT 1947, supra note 28, art. I.
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ment to economic transactions originating in, or destined for,
other countries that are entitled to the benefit of this norm.64
Exceptions to this rule are permitted only when special circum-
stances exist, such as customs unions, regional trading ar-
rangements (RTAs), or free trade area agreements (FTAs), and
special conditions for developing countries and economies.65
The MFN non-discrimination requirement of Article I and
the resulting norm of economic equality are important because
they establish a basis by which member states can bring unfair
unilateral trade regulations of other member states before the
DSB as a multilateral issue.66 Under GATT dispute settlement
procedures, WTO panels and reports were established, thus
eliminating a party's ability to block the adoption of panel re-
ports. 67 The dispute settlement procedures thereby further nar-
row the scope of unilateral acts that can be taken by states. For
various reasons, China's pegged yuan controversy is considered
a violation of WTO standards that can be brought before the
DSB.
The WTO criterion for an actionable subsidy is a finding of
a requisite contribution that benefits a specific Chinese indus-
try.68 A requisite contribution normally consists of some form of
payment or price support for the industry.69 The difficulty in
64. JACKSON, supra note 63, at 58.
65. GATT 1947, supra note 28 arts. XXXVI-XXXVIII, XXIV.
66. Beukel, supra note 60, at 4; JACKSON, supra note 63, at 384.
67. Beukel, supra note 60, at 4 (citing BERNARD HOEKMAN & MICHEL
KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM-FROM GATT
TO WTO, at 44 (1996)).
68. See URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING
MEASURES, Articles 1-9, [hereinafter WTO SCM Agreement]. A subsidy must be
"specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (referred
to in this Agreement as 'certain enterprises')." Id., art. 2.1.
69. Article 1.1 of the WTO SCM Agreement deems a subsidy to exist if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body
within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as "gov-
ernment"), i.e. where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants,
loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities
(e.g. loan guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected
(e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits);
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastruc-
ture, or purchases goods;
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or
directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illus-
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fulfilling this requirement is to be able to link the pegging of the
yuan to a direct benefit to the industry in the form of payments
and price supports.7 0 The International Monetary Fund (IMF),
through its Articles of Agreement at Article IV, has primary ju-
risdiction over foreign exchange rate policies, and prohibits un-
fair advantage by currency manipulation.7 1
While a challenge could be mounted against China based
upon Article XV, paragraph 4, of the GATT 1994,72 which bars
participating members from using "exchange rate action" to
frustrate the intent of the WTO Agreement, 73 as long as China's
exchange rate policy is in conformity with the IMF Agreement,7 4
such a dispute will not be subject to jurisdiction of the WTO
DSB. Under such circumstances, the DSB is precluded from de-
termining whether the yuan is being manipulated or being
grossly overvalued. 75 The pegged yuan is therefore currently
not considered to be in violation of the IMF Agreement and
trated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the govern.
ment and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally fol-
lowed by governments;
or
(a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article
XVI of GATT 1994;
and
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.
Id. art. 1.1(a).
70. Id., arts. 1.1(a) & 2(b), ("[A] benefit is thereby conferred."); see also, Beni-
tah, supra note 18, 2 (asserting that a lack of a currency exchange market in
China, in which the value of the yuan is determined by supply and demand, attenu-
ates arguments that the yuan is manipulated for the benefit of a specific industry).
71. ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND [herein-
after IMF Agreement], art. IV sec. 3(a) ("The Fund shall oversee the international
monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation, and shall oversee the
compliance of each member with its obligations under Section 1 of this Article.").
72. GATT 1947, supra note 28, art. XV ("Contracting parties shall not, by ex-
change action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade
action, the intent of the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund.").
73. See Benitah, supra note 18, 2.
74. See IMF Agreement, supra note 71, art. IV sec. 3(a).
75.
Any question of interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement arising
between any member and the Fund or between any members of the Fund
shall be submitted to the Executive Board for its decision, If the question
particularly affects any member not entitled to appoint an Executive Direc-
tor, it shall be entitled to representation in accordance with Article XII,
Section 3().
Id. art. XXIX, Interpretation, (a).
2004] THE KAGAN THESIS AND LEGALIFICATION
GATT.76 Rather, China's currency regime is considered to be
prima facie in compliance with the IMF agreement. Therefore,
China may maintain its currency exchange regime as it deems
appropriate.7 7 China, however, is not precluded from being
brought before the IMF and GATT for manipulating its currency
for purposes of unfair competition. The problem of proving such
manipulation is the IMF's lack of dispute settlement procedure
and the prerequisite of IMF action before issues of currency ex-
change can be brought before the DSB.78
The findings of the Senate in the Fair Currency Enforce-
ment Act of 2003 at sections 2 (18) and (19) on the other hand,
do offer a basis upon which action can be taken against China.
According to this Act, manipulations of currency by under-
valuation are actionable subsidies and countervailing measures
distorting fair competition.7 9 In addition, the Fair Currency En-
forcement Act of 2003 at Sections 2 (16) and (17)80 also incorpo-
76. See Denters, supra note 29, 3; see also IMF Agreement, supra note 71,
art. IV sec. 2(b)-(c). In particular, Article IV, sec. 2 (c), reads:
To accord with the development of the international monetary system, the
Fund, by an eighty-five percent majority of the total voting power, may
make provision for general exchange arrangements without limiting the
right of members to have exchange arrangements of their choice consistent
with the purposes of the Fund and the obligations under Section 1 of this
Article.
IMF Agreement, supra note 71, art. IV sec.2(c).
77. IMF Agreement, supra note 71, art. IV sec. 2 (b)-(c).
78. See Denters, supra note 29, 3; IMF Agreement, supra note 71, art. XXIX,
Interpretation, (a) (noting that Article XXIX of the IMF Agreement "is not intended
to settle disputes between members as a WTO dispute settlement panel might re-
solve a trade dispute").
79. The Fair Currency Enforcement Act of 2003 requires negotiation and ap-
propriate action with respect to certain countries that engage in currency manipula-
tion and the relevant portions read as follows:
(18) Deliberate currency manipulation by nations to significantly under-
value their currencies also may be interpreted as a violation of the Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Or-
ganization (as described in section 101(d)(12)) of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, which could lead to action and remedy under the World
Trade Organization dispute settlement procedures.
(19) Deliberate, large-scale intervention by governments in currency mar-
kets to significantly undervalue their currencies may be a nullification and
impairment of trade benefits precluded under Article XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and subject to remedy.
Fair Currency Enforcement Act, S. 1592, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).
80.
(16) Article IV of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund prohibits currency manipulation by a member for the purposes of
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rates Article IV of the IMF agreement. Section 2 (16) of the Fair
Currency Enforcement Act, however, more broadly defines the
prohibited acts of the IMF Articles of Agreement as "protracted
large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange mar-
ket."8 1 The exchange rate frustrating the intent of the IMF and
GATT is also addressed in section 2(17) of the Fair Currency
Enforcement Act as "exchange action," not "exchange rate ac-
tion," as it appears in the IMF and GATT.82
The shortcoming of the Fair Currency Enforcement Act is
that it is inconsistent with previous Treasury Department in-
quiries into China's foreign exchange rate regime.8 3 The Treas-
ury Department, as required by the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988, has annually analyzed the exchange
rate policies of China including China's pegged yuan, which has
been a problem since 1994.84 Under this Act, the Treasury De-
partment seeks to determine whether China manipulates the
currency exchange rate between the yuan and the dollar for
purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjust-
gaining an unfair competitive advantage over other members, and the re-
lated surveillance provision defines 'manipulation' to include 'protracted
large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange market.'
(17) Under Article XV of the Exchange Agreements of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, all contracting parties 'shall not, by exchange
action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement, nor by
trade action, the intent of the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund.' Such actions are actionable violations. The intent of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Exchange Agreement, as stated in
the preamble of that Agreement, includes the objective of 'entering into re-
ciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade, and currency manipulation
may constitute a trade barrier disruptive to reciprocal and mutually advan-
tageous trade arrangements.'
Id.
81.
No member shall engage in, or permit any of its fiscal agencies referred to
in Article V, Section 1 to engage in, any discriminatory currency arrange-
ments or multiple currency practices, whether within or outside margins
under Article IV or prescribed by or under Schedule C, except as authorized
under this Agreement or approved by the Fund. If such arrangements and
practices are engaged in at the date when this Agreement enters into force,
the member concerned shall consult with the Fund as to their progressive
removal unless they are maintained or imposed under Article XIV, Section
2, in which case the provisions of Section 3 of that Article shall apply.
IMF Agreement, supra note 71, art. VIII sec. 3.
82. See Fair Currency Enforcement Act, S. 1592, 108th Cong. §§ 2 to 7 (2003).
83. See DeRosa, supra note 8; see also S. 1586, 108th Cong. (2003).
84. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5304-5305
(1988).
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ments, or for gaining an unfair competitive advantage in inter-
national trade.8 5 In Treasury Department reports to Congress
on International Economic and Exchange Rate policies, Treas-
ury Secretary Snow reported that while China has pegged its
currency since 1994 at 8.28 to the dollar, this practice does not
meet the criteria in the Trade Act to warrant formal sanctions.8 6
C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF LEGALIFICATION (VERRECHTLICHUNG)
Legalification (Verrechtlichung) is the upgrading of a mere
agreement without legal quality to an authoritative instrument
of law.8 7 The possibility of legalification brings to light the prob-
lem of transitioning to the WTO, and integrating the GATT
1947,88 and its successive trade negotiation rounds,8 9 such as
the Uruguay Round agreements (GATT 1994),90 into a single
authoritative legal system. 91
The WTO dispute settlement system is the crowning piece
of judicialization in modern international trade relations, be-
cause the presence of binding third party enforcement makes
the WTO the most judicialized international organization cur-
rently in existence. 92 Judicialization is semantically distin-
guishable from legalization. 93 Legalization is the process of
making laws, or the legislative process of law making, whereas,
judicialization, as a derivative of the term judicial, refers to
court-like procedures, such as international dispute settlement
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., 2004 REP. TO CONGRESS ON INT'L ECON. ExCH. RATE POLICIES, su-
pra note 51, 9;
DEPT. OF TREASURY, REP. TO CONGRESS ON INT'L ECON. ExCH. RATE POLICIES (2003),
available at http://banking.senate.gov/_files/Exreport.pdf (hereinafter 2003 REP. TO
CONGRESS ON INT'L ECON. ExCH. RATE POLICIES ); DEPT. OF TREASURY, REP. TO
CONGRESS ON INT'L ECON. EXCH. RATE POLICIES (2002), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/update2002fxreport.pdf (hereinafter
2002 REP. TO CONGRESS ON INT'L ECON. EXCH. RATE POLICIES).
87. See Legalification Definition, supra note 27.
88. See generally GATT 1947, supra note 28, arts. I-XXXVIII.
89. See World Trade Organization, Pre-WTO Legal Text, at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs-e/legal-e/prewtojlegal-e.htm.
90. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994).
91. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 231 (Routledge 7th ed. 1997).
92. Dirk De Bi~vre, International Institutions and Domestic Coalitions: The
Differential Effects of Negotiations and Judicialization in European Trade Policy,
EUROPEAN U. INS. (EUI) WORKING PAPER SPS No. 2003/17, at 10 (2003), available at
http://www.iue.it/PUB/sps2003-17.pdf.
93. Id. at n.8.
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or domestic quasi-review procedures. 94 The dispute resolution
mechanism of the WTO, the DSB, 95 lends to judicialization, not
legalization, because it handles trade disputes on a case-by-case
basis. It is here that one witnesses why the WTO may represent
the crowning piece of judicialization in international trade rela-
tions. Jurisprudence of international trade serves as a genuine
hope for governance in international trade by creating authori-
tative rule making that "encompasses making, implementing
and adjudicating rules."96
The legalization-judicialization dichotomy, however, does
not clearly provide sufficient meaning for legalification. Legali-
fication poses greater implications for legal systems. It carries a
harsher penalty for international intergovernmental organiza-
tions such as the WTO, because the process of legalification can
be described in terms of obligation, precision, and delegation re-
sembling a legal rule; establishing a legal institution is deemed
as a halt to future development.9 7 Under legalification, a WTO
regime of residual importance, therefore, would have numbered
days as a vehicle for trade liberalization. The challenge of insti-
tuting an effective, wider global governance mechanism there-
fore is that trade policy agendas require a well-functioning mul-
tilateral rule-based trading system.98 The need for an effective
trade governance mechanism presents the critical concern of
whether the WTO regime will constitute no more than the up-
grading of a mere agreement without legal quality to an au-
thoritative instrument of law.99
In terms of the WTO, judicialization and a rules-oriented
approach to trade disputes serve as an antithesis to mere legali-
fication. A prime example of legalification and its attendant
problems was present in the functioning of the WTO's predeces-
sor, GATT 1947. The WTO is one of the most sophisticated in-
ternational legal systems in international law due to the exis-
tence of a multilateral WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 100
94. Id.
95. See WTO Agreement, supra note 7, Annex 2 [hereinafter Understanding on
Rules and Procedurds Governing the Settlement of Disputes].
96. Hooghe & Marks, supra note 31, at 3 n.2.
97. FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS AND DECISIONS: ON THE
CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, Ch. 7 (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
98. See Hon. Clement J. Rohee, Multilateralism at the Crossroads, Address at
the Annual WTO Public Symposium, Geneva 3-4 (May 25-27, 2004), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/symp04-paper-rohee-e.doc.
99. Legalification Definition, supra note 27.
100. Dana T. Blackmore, Eradicating the Long Standing Existence of a No-
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The WTO completely replaces GATT 1947 and gives it enforce-
ment power.10 1 The problem with GATT 1947 was that its nego-
tiation and consensus based dispute resolution system did not
promote greater compliance with GATT rules. 102 The WTO
DSU, which is the backbone of WTO system,10 3 offers a more ef-
ficient, dependable, and rules-oriented system, rather a negotia-
tionconsensus system, for resolving trade disputes within a
multilateral framework. 10 4
D. UNITED STATES-CHINA TRADE POLICY
Motivations for activist trade policy can be divided into four
groups: revenue-governments' collection of income by taxing
trade; mercantilism-a belief that imports are bad and exports
are good; trade barriers, implemented for agricultural and in-
dustrial development; and finally, trade policy, as a means of
redistributing income. 105
The latter two motivations reflect politics and protection-
ism. 106 Protectionism is arguably good politics.1 0 7 Protectionist
Precedent Rule in International Trade Law-Looking Toward Stare Decisis in WTO
Dispute Settlement, 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG., 487, 488 (2004).
101. Id. at 488-89.
102. Id. at 489; see also JACKSON, supra note 63, at 403-05.
In the GATT, there is no explicit indication of a "consensus practice," and
the word "consensus" is not used. The reason that the consensus practice
developed was partly the uneasiness of governments about the loose word-
ing of GATT decision-making powers, particularly that in GATT Article
XXV. Partly because of this uneasiness, the practice developed of avoiding
strict voting .... In the practice of GATT, however, the word "consensus"
was not defined .... In the WTO Charter, however, consensus is defined
(at least for some purposes).
Id.
103.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is the legal text that spells
out the rules and procedures for settling disputes in the WTO. It contains
27 articles, is a legally binding negotiated agreement among all the WTO
member governments, and is the ultimate means of enforcing the WTO's
trade rules. That makes it the backbone of the multilateral trading sys-
tem.
Blackmore, supra note 100, at 489 (citing WTO Review of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, at http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto_e/ministe/min99e/englishl
aboute/19dis e.htm).
104. Blackmore, supra note 100, at 490.
105. BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTEcIU, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM THE WTO AND BEYOND 21 (2nd ed. Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2001).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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policy, however, results in an inequitable redistribution of in-
come, in which some segments of society gain at the expense of
other groups.108 Protectionist trade policy especially benefits in-
terest groups. 10 9 Special interest groups, such as auto manufac-
turers, steel companies, the textile industry, and others, have
much to gain from seeking the aid of government in protecting
them from foreign competition. 110 The downside of protectionist
legislation, however, is that it results in higher consumer
prices.1 1' A protectionist policy that benefits a small number of
producers at the expense of a large number of consumers creates
a threat to free trade." 2 The philosophy of international trade
theory and comparative advantage seeks to maximize consump-
tion and welfare through free trade and by economic model-
ing.11 3 The inherent dangers of an activist trade policy and re-
sulting protectionism are that groups that seek protectionist
policies are willing to offer political support to incumbent gov-
ernment challengers during elections as a quid pro quo.1 4
U.S. trade policy is predominately shaped by Congress,
which has a greater proclivity towards protectionism than the
President. Congressional representatives are more likely than
the president to be swayed by the demands of local constituents
in their quests to seek re-election. 11 5 Local constituents are
swayed by special interest groups such as non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs), which disseminate information and opin-
ions about world events, and bring to the attention of constitu-
ents what would otherwise be seemingly innocuous events.11 6
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Robert W. McGee, The Philosophy of Trade Protectionism, Its Costs and Its
Implications, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 539, 541 (1993) ("As Vilfredo
Pareto succinctly put it in 1927: 'A protectionist measure provides large benefits to a
small number of people, and causes a very great number of consumers a slight loss.
This circumstance makes it easier to put a protection measure into practice."').
111. Id.at542.
112. Id.
113. See Block, supra note 35, at 422 (discussing arguments in favor of interna-
tional labor standards and noting how tying international trade privileges to higher
labor standards could improve the welfare of the citizens of a country) (internal
footnotes omitted).
114. HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 105, at 22.
115. Ka Zeng, Trade Structure and the Effectiveness of America's "Aggressively
Unilateral" Trade Policy, INT'L STUDIES Assoc. (ISA) CONVENTION PAPERS, at 36 n.9
(2002), available at http://www.isanet.org.
116. Jeremy Rabkin, Is National Sovereignty out of Date?, HAL CLOUGH
LECTURE FOR 2000 (Inst. Pub. AfM., Melbourne, Vict., Austl.), at 5, 9-10, available at
http://www.ipa.org.au/pubs/Currentissdocs/CloughOO.pdf (discussing sovereignty and
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One problem of interest groups is that not all interest groups
were born equal: lower information and organization costs set
smaller groups apart from larger ones. All interest groups,
however, are instrumental in influencing politics such that their
acts indirectly produce protectionist national and international
laws and regulations. 117 The strength of special interest groups
becomes even more apparent when they are compared to the
dispersed general interest displayed by the consumers, the gen-
eral public, and taxpayers, who interact in the realm of trade. 118
Non-economic factors such as the influence of special inter-
est groups played a critical role in determining the timing of
China's accession to the WTO. 119 Prior to China's accession, the
Chinese economy was generally perceived to be a transitioning
economy: a socialist economy transitioning to a socialist market
economy. The economic growth of transition economies has his-
torically been linked to the foreign policies of member states of
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), especially that of the United States. 120
The United States was slow to grant China unconditional
Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. 121 This hesitancy on the
part of the United States can be traced back to the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act. This Act prohibited
the grant of unconditional MFN status to non-market econo-
supernational authority).
117. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading Sys-
tem Through the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6
EuR. J. INT'L L., 1, 11-12 (1995), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal]Vol6/No2/
artl.pdf.
118. Id.
119. See Frederick M. Abbott, China's Accession to the WTO, ASIL INSIGHTS,
1-5, (Jan. 1998), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insighl3.htm; see also Alan Win.
Wolff, A U.S. Vision of Liberalization of Trade and Investment, Remarks Before the
Trilateral Forum (U.S.-Japan-China) in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 14, 1996), available at
http://www.dbtrade.com/publications/191189a.htm.
120. See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 105, at 21-22; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), Overview of the OECD: What is it? History? Who Does
What? Structure of the Organization?, at http://www.oecd.org/document/1810,2340,en
2649_201185_- 2068050_1_1_1 1,00.html (noting that the OECD's role has been "to
build strong economies in its member countries, improve efficiency, hone market
systems, expand free trade and contribute to development in industrialised as well
as developing countries.") (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
121. See James A. Dorn, Time to Repeal the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, Cato
Institute, http://www.cato.org/dailys/O7-19-99.html (Jul.19, 1999) (discussing the
annual debate over China's trade status); see also Wayne M. Morrison, China and
the World Trade Organization, CRS REP. FOR CONG. (Cong. Res. Serv., Library of
Cong.), Nov. 19, 2001, at 4-5, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documentsl
organizations6560.pdf.
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mies, which did not allow free emigration. 122 Between 1974 and
the United States's grant of MFN and permanent normal trade
relations status to China, China and other non-market econo-
mies had to renew their MFN status annually, subject to review
by the president and congressional approval. 123 China had diffi-
culty obtaining MFN status because of the United States's insis-
tence that China improve its human rights record and make
changes to its foreign policy such as in its relations with Tai-
wan.124 United States protectionist policy resulting from U.S.
domestic politics played a key role during this pre-accession pe-
riod.125  Congressional Democrats voted in accord with the
wishes of trade unions that blamed U.S. job losses on Chinese
competition.126 Congressional Republicans were also not free
from the influence of special interest groups.1 27 They were con-
cerned with winning votes of conservative religious groups,
which were critical of China's birth control record and Commu-
nist legacy of denying religious freedom and liberties. 128 In the
grand scheme of things, U.S. trade policy has been a reflection
122. Vladimir N. Pregelj, The Jackson-Vanik Amendment: A Survey, CRS REP.
FOR CONG. (Cong. Res. Serv., Library of Cong.), Sept. 20, 2000, at 2-3, available at
http://www.usvtc.org/Documents/CRS%20Reports/CRSJackson-Vanik.pdf (last vis-
ited Sept. 13, 2004).
123. Id. at 5.
124. See Dorn, supra note 121; Kerry Dumbaugh, China-U.S. Relations: Current
Issues for the 108h Congress, CRS REP. FOR CONG. (Cong. Res. Serv., Library of
Cong.), Jul. 25, 2003, at 1-8, available at www.fas.org/man/crs/RL31815.pdf (last
visited Oct. 9, 2004).
Taiwan remains the most sensitive and complex issue in Sino-U.S. rela-
tions. Beijing maintains it has the option to use force should Taiwan de-
clare independence from China .... U.S. policy toward Taiwan has been
shaped by the three U.S.-China communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act
(P.L. 96-8), and the so-called "Six Assurances."
Id. at 8-9.
125. See, e.g., HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 105, at 21-22, 404; David M.
Lampton, Ending the MFN Battle, 8 NBR ANALYSIS No. 4, at 7-9 (Nat'l Bureau of
Asian Res. 1997).
126. See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 105, at 21-22, 404; Joseph Kahn,
Last-Ditch Effort by 2 Sides to Win China Trade Vote, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2000, at
Al & A14.
127. See President Bill Clinton, Remarks Regarding China: Florida's New Mar-
ket of Opportunity Program at Airport Hilton Tampa, Florida (Jul. 31, 2000) (tran-
script available at http://www.hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uscn/wh/2000/073101.htm).
128. See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 105, at 21-22, 404; 146 CONG. REC.
S8132-01, S8132-02 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2000) (statement of Sen. Wellstone), 2000 WL
1269130, 2000 WL 1269166 (arguing for Religious Freedom Amendment to H.R.
4444 by authorizing extension of nondiscriminatory treatment to the People's Re-
public of China).
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of the wishes of domestic constituencies and lobbyists. 129
Most problematic is the U.S. use of foreign trade policy as a
tool in rewarding its foreign allies and punishing its enemies. 130
Since 2000, countries that have been subject to total or near-
total restrictions include Burma, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North
Korea, Sudan, and Yugoslavia. 131 The Jackson-Vanik Amend-
ment, Section 402(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, manifests this
reward/punishment nature of U.S. foreign policy. 132 The goal of
the amendment is "to assure the continued dedication of the
United States to fundamental human rights."133 In light of the
growing protectionist acts taken by the United States against
China, the decision of the U.S. Congress to grant permanent
MFN status to China represented a victory for the international
trade system. 134
E. THE KAGAN THESIS
Robert Kagan, in what is known as the "Kagan Thesis," de-
scribes the United States as possessing unique strengths, mak-
ing the world unipolar,135 and accounts for an increasing U.S.
129. Sam Vaknin, Analysis: The Jackson-Vanik Debate, United Press Interna-
tional, at http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StorylD=29052002-105921-5171r (May 29,
2002).
130. Id.; see also Ted Galen Carpenter, Eagle in the China Shop: The Economic
Consequences of U.S. Global Meeting, in ECONOMIC CASUALTIES: How U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY UNDERMINES TRADE, GROWTH, AND LIBERTY 5-6 (Daniel T. Griswold &
Solveign Singleton eds., Cato Inst., 1999) (discussing use of trade embargos for pur-
pose of advancing Washington's foreign policy agenda).
131. CATO INST., CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE 107TH CONGRESS 634 (2001), available at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/
handbook/hbl07-61.pdf [hereinafter CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS].
132. See Vaknin, supra note 129; James Dorn, To Promote Trade, Repeal Jack-
son-Vanik, Center for Trade Polity Studies, at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/articles
/jd-7-14-99.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2004) ("That amendment was designed to
deny most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status to communist countries, notably the
Soviet Union, in order to encourage more open emigration.").
133. See Pregelj, supra note 122, at 2-5 ("Although the introductory sentence of
the Jackson-Vanik amendment mentions 'the continued dedication of the United
States to fundamental human rights,' its operative provisions condition the restora-
tion of the access of an NME country to the covered benefits solely on the country's
freedom-of-emigration policy.") (emphasis in original); see also Vaknin, supra note
129, at 4 ('President Clinton tacitly admitted as much when he publicly decoupled
trade policy from human rights in 1994.").
134. See, e.g., HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 105, at 21-22, 404; CATO
HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS, supra note 131, at 633.
135. See Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, FOREIGN AFF.
1990/1991, at 23, 24 (discussing the unipolarity of America). But see Samuel P.
Huntington, The Lonely Superpower, FOREIGN AFF. , Mar./Apr. 1999, at 36. Con-
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tilt toward unilateralism rather than multilateralism. 136 Ac-
cording to this view, strong countries are attracted to unilateral
options, while weak countries will seek refuge in multilateral-
ism. This model is thought to typify the European weakness in
international relations. The Kagan Thesis primarily addresses
the growing transatlantic divide between the United States and
the European Union. 137 In terms of international relations, the
Kagan Thesis specifically addressed a growing divergence be-
tween foreign policy perspectives of the United States and
Europe. 138 Robert Kagan justified unilateralism as follows:
Americans are powerful enough that they need not fear Europeans,
even when bearing gifts. Rather than viewing the United States as a
Gulliver tied down by Lilliputian threads, American leaders should re-
alize that they are hardly constrained at all, that Europe is not really
capable of constraining the United States.
1 39
II. THE KAGAN THESIS AND LEGALIFICATION OF THE
WTO
It has been suggested that the dispute concerning China's
currency exchange regime will eventually be resolved by resort-
ing to diplomacy and politics. 140 This suggestion thereby attrib-
utes a minor role to the rule of law and jurisprudence of interna-
tional trade. It may be true that a diplomatic or political
solution is the preferred solution. The ramifications of a diplo-
matic solution, however, are far-reaching in terms of interna-
tional law and trade, especially in that Western countries' vi-
sions of new world-order are likely to collide with those of non-
Western countries. Specifically, there is an inherent danger
versely, Samuel P. Huntington argues that the world is a three-part hybrid, consist-
ing of the unipolar, bipolar and multipolar, identified as a "uni-multipolar system
with one superpower and several major powers." Id. at 36. (emphasis in original).
136. See John Van Oudenaren, Unipolar Versus Unilateral, POL'Y REV.,
Apr.IMay 2004, at 63, 65.
137. See KAGAN THESIS, supra note 26, at 3-4 ("The reasons for the transatlan-
tic divide are deep, long in development, and likely to endure.").
138. See id. at 4 ('When it comes to setting national priorities, determining
threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defense
policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways."). A growing divide is his-
torically attributed to the end of the Cold War. Id. at 20-21.
139. Id. at 102.
140. See Denters, supra note 29, 1 (discussing that a "bipartisan group of
senators urged the Congress to adopt legislation that allows for 'appropriate action'
if the negotiations with China regarding its undervalued currency and currency ma-
nipulation are not successful").
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that countries may read and respond to the China controversy
in politically motivated ways. 141
One potential danger is unilateralism and Hobbesian multi-
lateralism. 142 There is a current trend toward "soft" globaliza-
tion, globalization through multilateral means, in response to
political solutions in international controversies. This trend is
especially strong among developed countries according to
economists such as Joseph Stieglitz, the retired vice-president of
the World Bank. According to Stieglitz, "globalisation doesn't
work. It doesn't work for the poor, it doesn't work for the envi-
ronment, [and] it doesn't work for the stability of the global
economy."143
When the United States filed a complaint with the WTO
against China on March 19, 2004 over a tax policy,1 44 it took a
"soft globalization" approach, resorting to rule of law, and the
multilateral WTO regime rather than hard globalization. 145
This filing was a positive step on the part of the United
States, 46 because it represented a step toward much needed
141. See Focus: Escalating Pressure on Yuan Revaluation, supra note 16 ("With
international attention focused on China's currency exchange rate, trade issues be-
tween China and the US have been quickly politicized and oversimplified to fit the
needs of politicians.").
142. See America's Image Problem Complicates War on Terror, Detroit
News.Com, at http://www.detnews.com/2004/editorial/0403/21/a16.95232.htm (Mar.
12, 1999) [hereinafter America's Image] ("Throughout Europe and the Middle East,
anti-American sentiment is growing, according to an international survey by the
Pew Global Attitudes Project, primarily due to the invasion of Iraq.").
143. Mireille Delmas-Marty, Justice for Sale, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Aug.
2003, 2 http://mondediplo.com/2003/08/O3marty?varrecherche=Mireille+Delmas-
Marty.
144. On March 24, 2004, the U.S. filed a request for Consultation regarding
China's value-added tax (VAT) on integrated circuits (ICs) in China. See China -
Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits: Requests for Consultations by the United
States, WTO Doc. WTIDS309/1 G[L/675 S/IL/160 (Mar. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu e/distabase-wto memberse.htm.
145. See Dai Yan, Last-Minute US Request Clouds Talks, Delays Deal, CHINA
DAILY, Mar. 20, 2004, at 1, http://www.chinadaily.com/cn/english/doc/2004-
03/20/content_316471.htm ('The US complaint, filed on Thursday, was the first
against China since it joined the WTO in late 2001. The complaint says a tax break
for domestically manufactured semiconductors gives them an unfair advantage over
imports.").
146. See U.S., China Resolve Chip Dispute, CNN.com, July 9, 2004, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/BUSINESS/07/08/china.trade.reut/.
The settlement brought a swift close to the World Trade Organization com-
plaint filed March 18 against China, the first such suit against Beijing
since it joined the WTO in 2001 .... In mid-June, the government said the
gap in the current account balance, the broadest measure of U.S. trade
with the rest of the world, grew to $144.9 billion in the first quarter. The
2004]
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true multilateralism in all relations with China. This need was
especially marked after the politically motivated U.S. responses
to the decrease in the value of the dollar, 147 and the Treasury
Department report to the U.S. Congress on China that "[s]erious
engagement with China on these issues will continue. 148 The
Treasury Department report may prognosticate a continuing
flurry of political and economic responses and continuing uni-
lateral acts in trade in response to the China controversy.
In the United States, the dialogue on international relations
has been dominated by debates between neo-realists and neo-
liberalists 149 regarding whether international relations policies
manifesting unilateralism 150 have a rightful place in the juris-
prudence of international trade.151 The survival and growth of
the multilateral trade regime, jurisprudence of international
trade, governance of international trade and the WTO, is critical
to China, the United States and the world, because free trade
benefits all participating countries. 152
The United States has long pursued a unilateral trade pol-
icy, backed by retaliatory threats of invoking Section 301 of
United States Trade Law.1 53 Despite having superior power and
U.S. trade deficit with China alone reached a record high $124 billion in
2003 and is expected to widen this year.
Id.
147. See Focus: Escalating Pressure on Yuan Revaluation, supra note 16.
148. See 2003 REP. TO CONGRESS ON INT'L ECON. EXCH. RATE POLICIES, supra
note 86, at 8-9.
149. See Beukel, supra note 60, at 4; see also Banu Bayramglu Lise, Climate
Politics and International Institution: Supporters of Global Environmental Coopera-
tion, Address at the Symposium on "Is Globalization Overpowering Democracy: The
Challenge for Ecology, Economy and Culture" at Prague - Villa Lanna (June 12-16,
2001), http://www.uek.cas.cz/GlobDem/FT-bayramoglu.htm ("Today the field of In-
ternational Relations is dominated by the contemporary debate between the neoreal-
ist perspective and neoliberal institutionalist approach and the debate has been ele-
vated to a new level.").
150. KAGAN THESIS, supra note 26, at 8 ("As for the United States, there is noth-
ing timeless about the present heavy reliance on force as a tool of international rela-
tions, nor about the tilt toward unilateralism and away from a devotion to interna-
tional law.").
151. JACKSON, supra note 63, at 120 ("In fact, an argument can be made that the
GATT jurisprudence which now exists-almost 200 reported cases-is the largest
significant body of case law experience developed for a major multilateral treaty of
broad purpose and application.").
152. See MALANCZUK, supra note 91, at 231.
153. See Zeng, supra note 115, at 1.
[Tlhe American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO) ... published a piece of news on its website, declaring that it
had handed in a petition to the US trade representative Robert Zoellick in
the hope that the government would use the 'Section 301 of US trade law'
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bargaining resources, the success of a unilateral trade policy has
been uneven. 154 This uneven record results because countries
such as China, Brazil and India, which are heavily dependent
on the U.S. export market, are more resistant to unilateral ne-
gotiation tactics than developed countries such as Canada, the
European Union, and Japan, which are less dependent on the
U.S. export market. 155 Assuming, arguendo, that there is a
weak case for violating trade by manipulating currency (yuan),
there is an inherent danger to accusatory conduct, which is lack-
ing in substantial basis, and is pursued by aggressive unilateral
trade policy. The majority of the world views the United States
as engaging in such activity and thereby adopting a Kagan The-
sis approach in its international trade relations. 156
Whenever the United States invokes protectionism, other
countries perceive the United States as exercising unilateral
power, resembling unilateralism, as espoused by the Kagan
Thesis. 157 The United States has often taken this unilateral
to stop China 'artificially keeping labor cost low.'
Will 'Section 301' Affect Chinese Economy, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Apr. 7, 2004, at
http://english.peopledaily.com/cn/20040406/eng2OO4O4O6_139607.shtml.
154. See Zeng, supra note 115, at 1.
155. See id.
This pattern is not readily explicable in terms of traditional realist theo-
ries, which on the basis of nations' underlying raw power balances, would
predict that on average American coercive diplomacy ought to work better
with countries whose raw material power should have put them in a more
disadvantaged position vis-i-vis the United States.
156. See Beukel, supra note 60, at 14; Stephen F. Szabo, Power and Hubris,
2002 AM. INST. FOR CONTEMP. GERMAN STUDIES 1, http://www.aicgs.orgc/power
.shtml.
Kagan's thesis is that Europeans and Americans no longer share a common
view of the world because they don't share a common view on the role and
desirability of power. In short, the Europeans are the victims of their own
successful project of European integration. The creation of the European
Union, has left them, in Kagan's view, living in a Kantian world of perpet-
ual peace, while the United States makes it all possible with its policing of
the Hobbesian world outside, which would otherwise threaten this harmo-
nious utopia.
Id.
157. See KAGAN THESIS, supra note 26, at 99.
The problem is that the United States must sometimes play by the rules of
a Hobbesian world, even though in doing so it violates Europe's postmodern
norms .... It must support arms control, but not always for itself. It must
live by a double standard. And it must sometimes act unilaterally, not out
of a passion for unilateralism but only because, given a weak Europe that
has moved beyond power, the United States has no choice but to act unilat-
erally.
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route rather than using the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB)158 for resolving trade disputes based upon the norm of
economic equality. 159
Unilateralism and Hobbesian multilateralism threaten the
future growth and prosperity of a U.S. economy and the WTO
multilateral trade regime. Free trade and free trade agree-
ments, on the other hand, produce bi-directional benefits; pro-
mote growth and prosperity in U.S.-China trade; promote trans-
parency, fairness and openness in trade regimes across the
board; make a positive contribution to strengthening the rule of
law; and enhance the national welfare of all nations.160
The benefits of multilateralism are many, especially in
terms of multilateral and liberalized trade. For example, multi-
lateral trade agreements ensure a non-discriminatory approach
with potential mutual benefits for all parties. "They reduce
trade distortions and simplify administration."'16' Furthermore,
reduction in tariff and non-tariff barriers brings significant
benefits to nations. Multilateral reductions in tariffs allow do-
mestic-produced products to compete more effectively in foreign
markets and reduce the prices that domestic consumers pay for
foreign imports. Under this model, foreign competition can also
put pressure on domestic producers to reduce prices. Similarly,
measures easing non-tariff restrictions on international trade
expand domestic access to foreign markets and allow more for-
eign-produced goods to reach domestic industries and consum-
ers. Increased international specialization allows for larger-
scale and more efficient production in some industries. In-
creased competition also encourages technological development.
Increased availability of lower-priced foreign goods reduces in-
Id.
158. See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes, supra note 95, art. 2; see also Blackmore, supra note 100, at
491-94.
159. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 63, at 57-58; Focus: Escalating Pressure on
Yuan Revaluation, supra note 16; Denters, supra note 28; DeRosa, supra note 8.
160. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), ENABLING
GLOBAL TRADE: DEVELOPING CAPACITY THROUGH PARTNERSHIP 5-7 (2002), available
at http://www.oecd.org/searchResult/0,2665,en_2649_- 201185_1_i_1_1 ,00.html;
Bilateral Trade Relations: China, Europa-European Commission, at http://www.
europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/china/index-en.htm; Bhagabita,
supra note 57.
161. See INT'L CHAMBER OF COM., Regional Trade Agreements and the Multilat-
eral Trading System, Doc. No. 103/226 final EN, http://www.iccwbo.orglhom/
statements-rules/statements/2002/Regional%20trade%2Oagreements multilateral
%20trading%system.asp (Nov. 27, 2002).
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flationary pressures and allows governments to pursue expan-
sionary economic policies. Multilateral trade also brings the di-
rect benefits of increased exports and cheaper imports. Without
multilateral trade governed by a strong WTO regime, nations
are "forced to deal with [each other] individually."162
In addition, multilateral trade creates even more direct po-
litical benefits. Multilateralism, not unilateralism, encourages
highly visible, cooperative efforts on the part of the world's mar-
ket-oriented economies to devise solutions to joint problems. A
successful multilateral trade regime encourages cooperation
among nations in solving other problems. 16 3 New geopolitical
and economic realties are forcing actors in the international
arena to see the common interests in harnessing the benefits of
globalization.164
Unilateral political dynamics have a disruptive effect on the
bi-directional sharing of mutual benefits and increase transac-
tion costs of WTO integration. 165 Unilateral acts by the United
States exhaust resources that could be diverted to more domes-
tic issues such as the equilateral redistribution of income. 166
Unilateral acts also appear to increase transaction costs such as
costs of negotiating, drafting, and enforcing contracts,167 par-
ticularly in light of empirical evidence suggesting that unipolar
U.S. trade acts and unilateral trade negotiations pursuant to
unilateral trade policy have been virtually ineffective. 68 Kagan
162. See Alice M. Rivlin, Director of the Congressional Budget Office, Statement
Before the Northeast-Midwest Senate Coalition 4 (Apr. 4, 1979) (transcript available
at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5213&sequence=O).
163. Id.
164. See Hon. Rohee, supra note 98, at 3, 5.
165. See generally Dieter Schmidtchen et al., Conflict of Law Rules and Interna-
tional Trade: A Transaction Costs Approach, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF LAW AND
ECON., DISCUSSION PAPER 2004-1, at 5, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=545763 (Mar. 2004).
The core question of transaction cost economics, as a part of New Institu-
tional Economics, is how transaction costs influence social interaction and
productive activities. It analyses how institutions economize on transac-
tion costs that may reduce, or even completely discourage, socially desir-
able activity .... Transaction costs are the costs of negotiating, drafting
and enforcing contracts. They include search and information costs, bar-
gaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs and, moreover,
the efficiency losses that result when conflicts are not perfectly resolved.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
166. See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 105, 21-22.
167. See Schmidtchen, supra note 165, at 25 (arguing that "the transaction costs
of international business can be reduced by a workable international legal order").
168. See Zeng, supra note 115, at 3-6, 20-29.
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Thesis type taxonomies frustrate the potential benefits of multi-
lateralism and a strong WTO regime.
There are other costs accompanying unilateral acts, espe-
cially in U.S. international relations. 169 Notwithstanding costs
of an expanding military budget resulting from such policies,
the costs are many and diverse, directly and indirectly affecting
the American populace in numerous ways. 170 Unilateral U.S.
trade policy and its attendant trade sanctions have been unsuc-
cessful as weapons of foreign policy and have harmed the inter-
ests of the United States in the world. In addition, trade sanc-
tions have deprived American companies of business
opportunities, punished domestic consumers, and hurt poor and
vulnerable people in target countries.1 71 A U.S. foreign policy
that seeks to punish a country with its unilateral acts by with-
holding exports of farm products, computers, or oil-drilling ser-
vices, will result in terrible effects for the United States and
other countries, which will find other global suppliers standing
ready to fill the gap. 172 Failed examples of U.S. unilateral trade
policy include the 1961 Cuba embargo, which failed to influence
the government of Fidel Castro, and the May 1997 Executive
Order banning most new American investment in Burma, which
failed to persuade the regime in Rangoon to cede its power to
the opposition party, and then they won the 1990 national elec-
tions. 173
Most importantly, the U.S. grant of MFN status to China
despite its refusal to improve its human rights record and nor-
malize its relations with Taiwan reflects the ineffectiveness of
169. See Robert Kagan & William Kristol, The Present Danger, NAT'L INTEREST,
Spring 2000, at 57.
170. See Carpenter, supra note 130, at 3-4.
The economic costs alone, paid by the American people, to maintain Wash-
ington's hegemonic policy have been substantial and pervasive. For exam-
ple, the demands of that role require a large and expensive military estab-
lishment. Despite the end of the cold war, U.S. military spending
(currently at $270 billion per year) dwarfs that of other industrialized coun-
tries. Japan spends just $42 billion and Germany a mere $27 billion. Each
American must pay more than $1,000 a year to support the military; the
burden for each German or Japanese is about $320. The opportunity cost
to American taxpayers-and to the American Economy-is considerable, and
has been for many decades.
Id.
171. See CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS, supra note 131, at 637.
172. See id. at 631; Nicolas R. Lardy, Normalizing Economic Relations with
China, 8 NBR ANALYSIS No. 4, at 19-20 (Nat'l Bureau of Asian Res. 1997).
173. See CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS, supra note 131, at 631.
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trade sanctions as a tool in pressuring China to comply with
U.S. wishes.174 From Cuba to China, and other target nations,
U.S. trade sanctions have not successfully changed the conduct
or behavior of target nations. As witnessed by U.S. trade policy
toward China, domestic politics, foreign policy, international re-
lations, and American nationalism 175 will often override multi-
lateral trade issues and the WTO trade regime. 176
When other nations emulate the United States and simi-
larly take unilateral, as opposed to multilateral, routes to re-
solve conflicts, international relations will have a proclivity to
be dominated by a state's strength as measured in material
power sources such as economic and military power, rather than
a rule-based system. 177 This type of unilateral measure is an
example of Kagan-Thesis type taxonomy and its attendant uni-
lateralism. 178
174. See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 105, at 21-22.
175. See generally KAGAN THESIS, supra note 26.
Nor was America's post-Cold War turn toward a more nationalist approach
to foreign policy simply the product of a rising Republican Right. Realist
international relations theorists and policymakers, the dominant intellec-
tual force in the American foreign policy establishment, also pushed the
United States back in the direction of a more narrow nationalism. They
decried what Michael Mandelbaum famously called the "international so-
cial work" allegedly undertaken by the Clinton Administration in Bosnia
and Haiti.
Id. at 82-83.
176. See Carpenter, supra note 130, at 5-6; C. Fred Bergsten, Muzzling Our
Economic Negotiators, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2003, at A19.
Treasury Secretary John Snow returned home apparently empty-handed
from his publicized visit to Asia last week. China rejected any rise in the
value of its currency against the dollar now, pledging only to let it float
more freely at some undefined point in the distant future. Japan would not
agree to let its currency move upward either, and in fact resumed interven-
tion to weaken the yen as soon as the secretary left Tokyo .... This was
not the first time that short-term foreign policy concerns trumped U.S. eco-
nomic interests within the administration.
Id.
177. See Beukel, supra note 60, at 12, 15-16.
178. See KAGAN THESIS, supra note 26, at 8.
But if it were literally true that the United States could not act unilater-
ally, we wouldn't be having a grand transatlantic debate over American
unilateralism. The problem today, if it is a problem, is that the United
States can "go alone," and it is hardly surprising that the American super-
power should wish to preserve its ability to do so. Geopolitical logic dic-
tates that Americans have a less compelling interest than Europeans in
upholding multilateralism as a universal principle for governing the behav-
ior of nations .... For Europeans, ideals and interests converage in a world
governed according to the principle of multilateralism. For Americans,
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Unilateralism poses the problems of the unattainable goal
of purely egalitarian decision-making rules. 179 On the contin-
uum of multilateral versus unilateral trade, there is no genuine
one-to-one relationship between multilateralism and rule gov-
ernance. Instead, there is an imbalance of power that is marked
by a state's unilateral actions and dominated by states possess-
ing greater material sources (economic and military) than others
do.180 Unilateral political dynamics, ultimately, will produce a
more power-based system rather than a system of free trade.1 81
The debate between realists and neo-liberalists in interna-
tional relations also threatens free trade. 18 2 Specifically, the
West-centric and Eurocentric taxonomies1 8 3 of neo-realism, neo-
liberalism, and development theory (dependency theory) seem to
condemn China and the developing countries to subservience, or
worse, "a state of progressive impoverishment and dependence
from which only prolonged struggle or revolutionary change
provides an outlet."'1 4 Developing countries often perceive that
their development agendas are being bypassed in the WTO for
rules benefiting the rich and powerful. In the face of realists
viewing world power as unjustly distributed and casting against
genuine multilateralism, an issue facing the WTO is whether
multilateralism can temper the negative effects of power politics
they do not converge as much.
Id. at 39 (emphasis in original).
Fischer stands near one end of the spectrum of European idealism. But
this is not really a right-left issue in Europe. Fischer's principal conten-
tion-that Europe has moved beyond the old system of power politics and
discovered a new system for preserving peace in international relations-is
widely shared across Europe .... In the "postmodern world," writes Coo-
per, "raison d'etat and the amorality of Machiavelli's theories of state-
craft... have been replaced by a moral consciousness" in international af-
fairs. American realists might scoff at this idealism.
Id. at 56-57 (internal footnotes omitted).
179. See Beukel, supra note 60, at 3.
180. See id. at 3 & n.6 ("Theories on international relations usually assume that
'egalitarian' refers to equality between states.") (internal citations omitted).
181. See id. at 3.
182. See KAGAN THESIS, supra note 26, at 27, 39, 56-57.
183. See Douglas Lemke, Development's Influence on War, INT'L STUDIES ASSOC.
(ISA) CONVENTION PAPERS, 2 (2002), http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/lemke.html
(quoting Stephanie Neuman's statement that "mainstream IR Theory- (classical)
realism, neorealism, and neoliberalism-is essentially Eurocentric theory, originat-
ing largely in the United States and founded almost exclusively on what happens or
happened in the West.").
184. See Louise Fawcett, Conclusion: Wither the Third World, in THE THIRD
WORLD BEYOND THE COLD WAR CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 245 (Louise Fawcett &
Yezid Sayigh eds., Oxford University Press 1999).
THE KAGAN THESIS AND LEGALIFICATION
and accommodate the poor and weak.185 Moreover, the effect of
unilateral political dynamics is not contingent on either the
relative weakness or strength of the U.S. accusation against
China, but rather, because free international trade benefits all
countries involved while unilateral acts do not.18 6
The basic philosophy underlying the Bretton Woods system
is the theory of comparative advantage, 8 7 which was originally
developed by David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill.l18 Ricardo
and Mill applied the market theory of Adam Smith to interna-
tional trade. 8 9 Comparative advantage assumes that liberalized
foreign trade and resulting international division of labor cre-
ates benefits for participating national economies. 190 A vision of
a new world order is one with reduced barriers to trade and
money transactions, and greater market access as means to
promote a greater level of employment, thus increasing real in-
come and optimizing production factors. 19' Notwithstanding the
debate concerning sovereignty, 192 traditional international trade
theory uses economic modeling to maximize consumer and pro-
ducer welfare. 193
The United States should be wary of engaging in unilateral
acts because it risks being labeled a rogue state in terms of in-
ternational trade. 194 To avoid such classification, it should em-
ploy more multilateral efforts such as those offered by DSB in
resolving trade disputes. 195 Unilateral political dynamics dis-
185. See Hon. Rohee, supra note 98, at 4.
186. Weng Li Cheng et al., A Ricardian Model with Endogenous Comparative
Advantage and Endogenous Trade Policy Regimes, CID WORKING PAPER No. 12, at
1, 19-21 (Ctr. for Int'l Dev. at Harvard U. 1999), available at http://www2.cid.
harvard.edu/cidwp/012.pdf.
187. See Block, supra note 35, at 419 ("Traditionally, economists have refer-
enced the 'factor cost model'... [.1 Specifically, the theory suggests that countries
should specialize in the production of goods in which they can produce at least
cost .... [T]heorists take into account a country's productive factor endowments,
including land, capital, labor and climate.").
188. See MALANCZUK, supra note 91, at 223.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 224 (stating that notwithstanding commitments to international
organizations set forth in U.N. Charter at Articles 1(3), 55(a) and (b), and 56, liberal
principles of the Bretton Woods Institutions often conflict with the sovereign equal-
ity of states).
193. See Block et al., supra note 35, at 419-21.
194. See KAGAN THESIS, supra note 26, at 29-30, 60 (discussing rogue states and
the axis of evil, and describing Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya as dangerous, un-
pleasant, and even "evil").
195. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
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rupt the world trade system, especially the WTO regime. Such
action also enhances the possibility of legalification of the WTO
Agreement, attenuation of trade agreement experiences, such as
unilateral negotiation tactics, 196 and frustration of the ability of
a strong global institution like the WTO to enforce a wider regu-
latory agenda. 19 7
When the United States attempted to resolve China's ma-
nipulation of the yuan through the use of its 301 mechanism
rather than resorting to the DSB, it thereby overshadowed and
weakened the functional power of the DSB.198 When attempts
at consultations failed, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 re-
quired the U.S. Trade Representative to use dispute settlement
procedures under applicable trade agreements, i.e., the DSB. 199
A problem of Section 301 is that while it recognizes that alleged
violations of the WTO Agreement are governed by the DSB,200 it
also mandates unilateral acts in its mandatory retaliation ac-
tion provision.20 1 Section 301 and the exception to the manda-
tory retaliation action provision regarding the WTO lends itself
to unilateral acts. Mandatory retaliation actions under Section
301 can only be waived if a WTO dispute settlement panel finds
that an act, policy, or practice, such as the pegging of the Chi-
nese yuan does not violate or deny U.S. rights under a trade
Disputes, supra note 95, arts. 2, 4-5.
196. See Zeng, supra note 115, at 3-6, 17-20 (arguing that the application of
Section 301 threat tactics against China was not successful).
197. For an example of such frustration, see Rabkin, supra note 116, at 8-10
(expressing hostility toward international pressure on sovereignty and stating that
"[sovereign states] have no great obligation to go along, just for the sake of building
international solidarity").
198. For statutory language of Section 301 measures, see 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-
2419 (1988) (relating to relief from foreign import restrictions and export subsidies).
For a brief overview of Section 301 measures, see Bruce Odessey et al., An Overview
of U.S. Trade Law, USIA J. 8-9 (Jun. 1997), at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/
ites/0697/ijee/ej7f&f.htm (explaining that section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is the
primary U.S. law used to enforce rights for U.S. corporations under trade agree-
ments).
199. See Odessey, supra note 198, 8-9 (stating that if after this step the dis-
pute remains unresolved, the USTR may take other actions, including suspension of
trade agreement's concessions, imposition of duties or other import restrictions, and
imposing fees or restrictions on services, and that a section 301 case can be initiated
either by a domestic petition or by the USTR on its own initiative).
200. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2) (stating that the USTR is not required to take
action if the Dispute Settlement Body is involved).
201. See id. § 2411(a)(1) (stating that if the USTR determines that a foreign gov-
ernment is violating or denying U.S. rights or benefits under a trade agreement, or
its acts, policies, or practices are unjustifiable and burden or restrict U.S. commerce,
Section 301 requires retaliation unless an exception applies).
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agreement. 20 2 A failure to pursue WTO DSB remedies precludes
the waiver, thereby justifying U.S. unilateral trade acts. While
the WTO DSB may allow the United States to obtain interna-
tional authorization to retaliate in appropriately filed trade dis-
putes, the WTO otherwise restricts the use of unilateral meas-
ures in trade disputes.2o3
The Kagan Thesis appropriately conceptualizes this in-
stance of U.S. international relations policy. By abiding by the
Kagan Thesis, U.S. foreign relations have created a "bad guy"
world image. This image was further strengthened by U.S. uni-
lateral acts in the context of the war in Iraq.20 4 Hobbesian mul-
tilateralism has farther-reaching applications, including the
United States's relationship with the developing world, and
countries such as China, which are experiencing robust eco-
nomic growth amidst legal and economic reform. 20 5
Assuming that the Kagan Thesis is accurate, protectionist
based accusations against China, such as the one brought by the
United States, exemplify a unipolar exercise of economic, rather
than military power. The U.S. attempt to coerce China into
floating its exchange rate reflects unilateralism on the part of
the United States, which stems from its use of economic and po-
litical, rather than military, force. This type of military unilat-
eralism fits with what Kagan describes as a willingness to by-
pass United Nations Security Council approval in initiating acts
of war and a willingness to go it alone. 206
The WTO General Council's (GC) decision on the Doha
Agenda work program, the "July package," agreed upon on Au-
gust 1, 2004, analogously presented another example of power
politics. 207 The "July package" was meant to restart trade ne-
202. See id. § 2411(a)(2) (describing the circumstances that waive the mandatory
retaliation requirement if the DSU is involved).
203. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
204. See America's Image, supra note 142 (reporting that "throughout Europe
and the Middle East, anti-American sentiment is growing .... primarily due to the
invasion of Iraq").
205. See 8% GDP growth forecast for 2004, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 11, 2003,
http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cnen/doc/2003-11/06/content_278919.htm.
206. See Amy E. Eckert & Manooher Mofidi, Doctrine or Doctrinaire-The First
Strike Doctrine and Preemptive Self-defense Under International Law, 12 TUL. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 117, 119 (2004).
207. See WTO General Council, Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the
General Council on 1 August 2004, WTO Doc. WT/L579 (Aug. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dda e/drafttext gc_dg_31julyO4_e.htm (con-
taining frameworks and other agreements designed to focus the negotiations and
raise them to a new level).
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gotiations following a failed 2003 Cancun summit. 208 Develop-
ing countries took issue with the July framework negotiations,
claiming that they deviated from traditional negotiations be-
tween developing and developed countries and the result was ef-
fectively a ministerial declaration that is not backed by any
ministerial meeting. Representatives of developing countries
fear that the "July package" may create an unwanted precedent
because only forty trade ministers were present, with some one
hundred absent. They also fear that the GC improperly by-
passed the ministerial conference by taking action at the July
GC meeting, and charging that the GC meeting supplanted the
need for a ministerial meeting. The gravest fear is that the GC
may become the de facto supreme institution for WTO decision-
making. Some developing countries are also hailing the GC's
decision as another triumph for the major superpowers, particu-
larly the United States. 209
Similarly, in the instance of the U.S.-China yuan contro-
versy, the United States elected to bypass the international or-
gan that is the WTO dispute mechanism. In this instance, the
United States failed to avail itself of the DSB,210 and instead
employed coercive economic and political pressure. Specifically,
it used unilateral negotiation tactics pursuant to unilateral
trade policy, which are outside the parameters of the WTO dis-
pute resolution mechanism. 211
Such unilateral acts are violations of the WTO norm of eco-
nomic equality.212 The inherent danger of the U.S. employment
of unilateral actions for purposes of favorably resolving trade
disputes is that unilateral actions unnecessarily challenge and
threaten the legitimacy of the WTO as an international inter-
governmental organization. They also threaten the jurispru-
dence of international trade and threaten to legalificate the
WTO Agreement. Kagan Thesis taxonomies produce retrograde
effects lending to legalification. As a result, the powers and po-
208. See World Trade Organization, Day 5: Conference Ends Without Consensus,
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minis-e/min03_l4septe.htm. (last visited
Sept. 20, 2004).
209. Walden Bello & Aileen Kwa, WTO: G 20 Leaders Succumb to Divide-and-
Rule Tactics: The Story Behind Washington's Triumph in Geneva, Focus on the
Global South, (Aug 10, 2004), at http://www.focusweb.org/main/html/Article408.html
?POSTNUKESID=00db2cOa6acab4e66fb491227cf7fba2.
210. See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes, supra note 95, arts. 1-17.
211. See Zeng, supra note 115, at 29-30.
212. See JACKSON, supra note 63, at 57-58.
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tential of the WTO DSB will eventually be retrograded to the
status of its predecessor, GATT, with a similar watered-down
deterrent effect.213
In terms of GATT or the WTO, the critical issue is ascer-
taining the line between governmental measures that are often
taken for legitimate domestic policy reasons, and measures so
predatory in nature that the international trading system
should no longer tolerate them. 214 The question of unilateralism
is not well regulated by either GATT or the WTO. Conse-
quently, such dilemmas result in a challenge to the jurispru-
dence of international trade.215 The United States cannot bene-
fit by partaking in unilateralism, and engaging in unilateral
negotiation tactics pursuant to unilateral trade policy. 216
U.S. protectionism can be linked to domestic politics 21 7 and
the 2004 presidential elections. 218 U.S. protectionism can also
be attributed to earlier Clinton administration policies, which
are still in force to a substantial degree under the Bush admini-
stration.21 9 The Kagan Thesis posits that policies of the Clinton
and Bush administrations rested on a common and distinctive
American assumption that the United States was the indispen-
sable nation, in that the United States seeks to defend and ad-
vance a liberal international order.220 The Clinton administra-
tion initially entered office talking about assertive
multilateralism, but ended up talking about America as the in-
dispensable nation.221
213. See Blackmore, supra note 104, at 489.
214. See JACKSON, supra note 63, at 118.
215. See id.
216. See Zeng, supra note 115, at 2-3.
217. See Focus: Escalating Pressure on Yuan Revaluation, supra note 16.
218. See id.
219. See, e.g., KAGAN THESIS, supra note 26, at 6-7; Marcus Noland, China and
the International Economic System, INST. FOR INT'L ECON. WORKING PAPER No. 95-6,
7 (1995), at http:lwww.iie.com/publications/wp/1995/95-6.htm ('Thus the over-
arching goals of United States economic policy toward China are to promote political
and economic liberalization within China (which the Clinton Administration explic-
itly views as linked), integrate China into global institutions, and pursue US com-
mercial interests (which the Administration largely identifies as exporters' inter-
ests)."); Bates Gill & Nicholas Lardy, China Searching for a Post-Cold War Formula,
BROOKINGS REV., Fall 2000, at 15, 16-18 (stating that the promotion of political and
economic liberalization is contingent upon securing China's full compliance with
global trading system rules).
220. See KAGAN THESIS, supra note 26, at 94.
221. See id. at 52 ('The lessons for Americans, including the top officials in the
Clinton Administration, was that even with the best intentions, multilateral action
could not succeed without a significant element of American unilateralism, an
American willingness to use its overwhelming power to dominate both war and di-
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Despite differences between neo-realists and neo-
liberalists, 222 both groups share an overriding interest of pro-
moting political and economic liberalization. 223 U.S. foreign pol-
icy accordingly links itself to a quest for a Kantian perpetual
peace.224 Kagan described this peace as having been actually
attained to a certain extent by the European Union in its
strategies of legalism and multilateralism. 225 He described
Europeans as favoring peaceful responses to crisis, favoring per-
suasion to coercion; more ready to appeal to international law,
international conventions and international organizations; and
most importantly, trying to employ commercial and economic
ties as means to bind nations together. 226
The end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization
seemed to point toward a new utopian international reality,
"[w]here-as different scholars predicted-history, geography,
and ideology would become things of the past, subsumed in a
new, highly interpenetrated and interconnected international
order."227 The utopian vision of a new international order paral-
lels the idealistic thinking that followed the First and Second
World Wars. 228 This utopian vision is commonly known as the
plomacy when weaker allies hesitated.").
222. IR Paradigms, Approaches, and Theories, IR Theory Web Site, at
http://www.irtheory.com/know.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004) (defining Neoliberal
as encompassing "those theories which argue that international institutions play an
important role in coordinating international cooperation" and Neorealism as fol-
lows):
Essentially, a systemic, balance of power theory developed by Kenneth
Waltz in which states do not seek to maximi[zle power, but merely balance
it. And because the international system is regarded as anarchic and
based on self-help, the most powerful units set the scene of action for others
as well as themselves.
Id.
223. See Lise, supra note 149, 4-6 ("Today the field of International Relations
is dominated by the contemporary debate between the neorealist perspective and
neoliberal institutionalist approach.").
224. See IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 10-23 (Lewis White Beck ed.,
Bobbs-Merril 1957) (1853).
225. See KAGAN THESIS, supra note 26, at 57 (arguing that "Europeans have
stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of perpetual
peace," and that "the United States solved the Kantian paradox for the Europeans").
Kagan generally attributes this solution to the Cold War, American buildup of mili-
tary power, defense of Europe and what he terms a free ride in terms of global secu-
rity for Europe. See id. at 54-57.
226. See id. at 5.
227. See Fawcett, supra note 184, at 1.
228. See id. ("[T]he end of a major war, even a 'cold' one, not unnaturally gives
rise to hopes for the evolution of a just, peaceful, and prosperous international or-
der.").
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Democratic Peace Thesis. The Democratic Peace Thesis is the
tenet that says that "democracies do not fight each other."229
The Democratic Peace Thesis also evolved into cosmopolitan
democracy, further evolving into models of world peace, democ-
racy, equality and justice.230
The Democratic Peace Thesis presents the question of
whether there is a nexus between free trade and the Democratic
Peace Thesis or Kant's perpetual peace.231 Moreover, assuming
arguendo that a casual relation exists, one must ascertain
whether the Democratic Peace Thesis more readily comes to
fruition through either neo-realism or neo-liberalism.
Cosmopolitan law, in conjunction with international law,
provides states with incentives to moral commitments, and fa-
cilitates the "spirit of commerce" to promote peace, not war.232
Cosmopolitan law fills the gap between traditional international
law, which applies primarily between nation-states, and domes-
tic constitutional law that regulates relations between a state
and its own citizens. 233
Liberal economic theory and its attendant comparative ad-
vantage theory posit that cosmopolitan ties evolve from coopera-
tive international divisions of labor and free trade. 234 Econo-
mies are better off than they would have been under autarchy,
acquiring incentives to avoid breaking economic ties. 235 Open
markets, as a corollary of free trade, are contingent on the as-
sumption that the next set of transactions will be determined by
legal rights and agreed upon prices, and not by coercion. Thus
avoiding military conflicts among liberal states or "enhancing
229. See generally Kant, supra note 224, at 10-23; Benjamin Solomon, Kant's
Perpetual Peace: A New Look at This Centuries-Old Quest, 5.1 ONLINE J. OF PEACE
AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1 106 (Summer 2003), at http://www.trinstitute.org/
ojpcr/5_lsolomon.pdf.
230. See Solomon, supra note 229, 1 106.
231. See James Lee Ray, Does Democracy Cause Peace?, 1 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
27, 43 (1998) ("The empirical evidence in favor of the proposition that democratic
states have not initiated and are not likely to initiate interstate wars against each
other is substantial.").
232. See Michael W. Doyle, Liberal Internationalism: Peace, War and Democ-
racy, Nobelprize.org, T 6, at http://nobelprize.org/peace/articles/doyle/html (discuss-
ing cosmopolitan sources of liberal peace).
233. See generally Pauline Kleingeld, Kants politscher Kosmopolitismus, in 5
ANN. REV. L. ETHICS (1997), http://www.str2.jura.uni-erlangen.de/JRE/volO5/a5-
klein.htm.
234. See Block et al., supra note 35, at 419-21.
235. See WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 126 (2nd ed. 1983) (defining autarchy as "economic self-sufficiency as na-
tional policy; getting along without goods from other countries").
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each other's security by means of alliance" naturally results in
economic interdependence. 236
Moreover, international economic interdependence lessens
the need for governmental planning of production and distribu-
tion.2 37 As a result, foreign states become less responsible for
outcomes.238 The international market thereby evolves into a
greater interdependence of commerce and the international con-
tacts of state officials, who, ultimately, serve as lobbyists for
mutual accommodation. 239 Merchants of commerce and trade
accordingly create interests in favor of accommodation, while of-
fering a variety of solutions to any potential challenges to this
relationship. 240 A combination of trust, property rights, and
mutual expectation of the rule of law makes economic and non-
economic disputes easier to resolve. 241  These cosmopolitan
sources of liberal peace, such as democracy, cosmopolitan law,
international law, international markets, and free trade foster
cosmopolitan ties lending to multilateralism, not unilateral-
ism. 242
Liberal institutions, liberal ideas, and transnational ties
function as important factors to promote sustained liberal peace
by encouraging the traits of liberal polities and economies to-
gether.24 3 It is in this manner that a Kantian perpetual peace
comes to fruition. In conjunction with empirical evidence indi-
cating that democratic states are not likely to initiate wars
against each other,244 there appears to be a causal relationship
between free trade and the Democratic Peace Thesis or Kantian
perpetual peace.
The only viable means for reaching the vision of world peace
or the perpetual peace envisioned by Kant is through multilat-
eralism, not unilateralism, or Hobbesian multilateralism. The
United States's unilateral actions in trade will ultimately have
damaging effects on the economies of both the United States
and China, including international relations and the quest for
236. Doyle, supra note 232, 7 ("The interdependence of commerce and the in-
ternational contacts of state officials help create crosscutting transactional ties that
serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation.") (internal footnote omitted).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Doyle, supra note 232, 7-8.
243. Id. 6.
244. See Ray, supra note 231, at 37-39 (summarizing various scholarly studies
on the history of military conflicts).
[Vol. 14:1
THE KAGAN THESIS AND LEGALIFICATION
Kantian perpetual peace. There seems to be a consensus among
neo-liberals, such as those espoused by the European Union,
that world peace in modern times is contingent on multilateral-
ism, not unilateralism or Hobbesian multilateralism.
The goals of the Bretton Woods Institutions,245 of U.S. for-
eign policy, and of the WTO are indistinguishable. All promote
political and economic liberalization on a worldwide scale. 246
U.S. foreign policy and its emphasis on political liberalism may
seem distinguishable from the goal of promoting free trade by
multilateral trade rules. Nevertheless, U.S. foreign policy par-
allels the goals of neo-liberalism, a European Union, and the
original foundational goals and policies of the Bretton Woods In-
stitutions. 24 7
As a testimony to the Kagan Thesis, the experiences of the
European Union parallel that of China, in that it too experi-
enced the threat of unipolar U.S. unilateral acts. 248 Now, both
the European Union and non-European Union powers such as
China, struggle against a supposed hegemonic power, the unipo-
lar United States.249
International conflict and division frustrates the goals of
multilateralism, disappointing the "spirit of commerce" and
trade. The Kagan Thesis operates as an antithesis to genuine
multilateralism and "soft" globalization. As an antithesis of
multilateralism and "soft" globalization, it prognosticates and
exacerbates international conflict, including U.S.-E.U. relations
and relations between developing and developed nations. A
problem of the Kagan Thesis is an expressed espousal of unilat-
eralism that justifies and prophesizes continued U.S. unipolar-
ity. The Kagan Thesis and its scriptures of neo-realism, power
politics, and unilateralism contribute to a division among na-
tions on a worldwide scale, which is contrary to aspirations of
multilateralism.
The earlier failure of the WTO meeting in Seattle and the
245. See MALANCZUK, supra note 91, at 223-25.
246. See Noland, supra note 219, at 7-14.
247. See MALANCZUK, supra note 91, at 223-25.
248. See KAGAN THESIS, supra note 26, at 40 ("From the European perspective,
the United States may be a relatively benign hegemon, but insofar as its actions de-
lay the arrival of a world order more conducive to the safety of weaker powers, it is
objectively dangerous.").
249. See Carey Schofield & Michael Smith, EU Force Will Not Need NATO, Says
French Military Chief (Mar. 28, 2001), News.Telegraph, at http://www.telegraph
.co.uklnews/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001/03/28/wforc28.xml; Michael Wines, In Let-
ter to Bush, Putin Urges Wider U.S-Russian Cooperation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2001,
at A5 (discussing the alliance of Russia with China and India).
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failure of the 2003 Fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO ex-
emplify the failure of genuine multilateralism and "soft" global-
ization, and legalification. At Cancun, much needed trade nego-
tiations collapsed because countries could not come to a
consensus and nearly brought a collapse to the Doha Develop-
ment Agenda.250 Chairman Luis Ernesto Derbez attributed a
lack of consensus to members remaining entrenched, particu-
larly on the "Singapore issues" of trade and investment, trade
and competition policy, trade facilitation, and transparency of
government procurement. 251 The "Singapore issues" are signifi-
cant because they represent a growing division between devel-
oped countries and developing countries. They also signify the
implications of an invocation of unilateralism and "hard" global-
ization, as demonstrated by developed countries and economies
in their insistence on a WTO treaty on foreign investment.252
The Kagan Thesis analogously presents the same dangers in
that it promotes unilateralism, and "hard" globalization, thereby
threatening legalification of the WTO agreement.
New geopolitical forces and economic realities affecting de-
veloping countries and economies create the need for a "new"
250. See Conference Ends Without Consensus, supra note 208, at 2-3.
251. See generally World Trade Organization, International Conference on Fi-
nancing for Development: Statement by Mr. Ouedraogo, WTO Deputy Director-
General to the Final Preparatory Committee, 14-25 January, New York, USA, at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/newsO2_e/ouedraogostatfin&devconfe.htm.
For more information on "Singapore issues," see C. Rammanohar Reddy, Decision
Time on Singapore Issues at WTO, HINDU, Jul. 28, 2003, http://www.hinduonnet.com
/thehindu/2003/07/28/stories/2003072803001200.htm.
These "new" or "Singapore" issues, so called because they first entered the
WTO agenda at the 1996 Singapore ministerial conference, were included
in 2001 in the agenda of the Doha round of trade talks only after tense ne-
gotiations between the European Union, which for years has been demand-
ing a WTO treaty on foreign investment, and India, which has been leading
the resistance to an expansion of the role of the WTO. A compromise then
pushed a final decision to the Cancun WTO conference. According to the
Doha ministerial declaration, which has now become the subject of differ-
ing legal interpretation, "negotiations will take place after the Fifth Ses-
sion of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by
explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations."
Id.
252. See KAGAN THESIS, supra note 26, at 54-57; Romano Prodi, President of the
European Commission, Speech on "Europe and Peace" at the University of Ulster,
10 (Apr. 1, 2004) (transcript available at http://europa-eu-un.org/articlesllt/article
_3372_lt.htm); Patrick J. Garrity, Old Europe, New Europe: A Review of Robert Ka-
gan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, 2003
CLAREMONT INST., 1-3, at http://www.claremont.org/writings/O30219garrity
.html.
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multilateralism, as opposed to Hobbesian multilateralism.
Eventually, the concerns of developing countries will have to be
addressed in a manner that they perceive as more fair, just and
democratic. 253 During the post-Cancun period and the July GC
meeting, the G20 group of developing nations has arisen as a
possible key player for developing countries in trade relations. 254
The G20 was thought to have broken a monopoly over trade ne-
gotiations held by the United States and the European Union.255
This equilibrium between trade powers in WTO negotiations
may be only temporary, however, because many developing
countries are not included in the G20. Power politics and the
marginalization of developing countries remain an ongoing con-
cern of the WTO and Doha Development Agenda. 256
The need for genuine multilateralism and "soft" globaliza-
tion are apparent. More specifically, it is a question of what
positive roles developed countries and economies, the OECD
group, and especially, the United States, all play in promoting a
"new" multilateralism and reducing the negative effects of
power politics and Hobbesian multilateralism. 257
In addition, other countries, including developing countries,
may take the lead from U.S. unilateral trade policy and increas-
ingly engage in unilateralist trade approaches. There would, as
a result, be an increase in protectionist trade activities, at-
tended by a corresponding increase in protectionist activities
such as anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases. In recent years,
the WTO has witnessed an increase in protectionist trade activ-
253. Amitav Acharya & Richard Stubbs, The Asian Pacific Region in the Post-
Cold War Era Economic Growth, Political Change, and Regional Order, in THE
THIRD WORLD BEYOND THE COLD WAR CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 118 (Louise Faw-
cett & Yezid Sayigh eds., Oxford University Press 1999).
254. Spawned by the G7 in 1999, the informal G20 collaboration began as an
international talking shop dedicated to maintaining global financial stability, and
five years later, the group's size has lent it a voice in official discussions of interna-
tional monetary issues. See John Kirton, What is the G20?, University of Toronto, at
http://www.g7,utoronto.ca/g2O/g2Owhatisit.html (noting that the G-20's initial 18
country members were, in addition to the G7, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China,
India, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey); see
also G-20 MEXICO, G-20 Background Information, at http://www.hacienda.gob.mxl
g20-2003[background.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2004).
255. See Bello & Kwa, supra note 209, 1-4.
256. See Walden Bello, D-Day for the WTO, Focus on the Global South, at
http://www.focusweb.org/trade/html/Article248.html?POSTNUKESID-
17852af03b423593 (last visited Sept. 27, 2004) (discussing the imbalance of bargain-
ing powers and noting that WTO trade negotiations have been historically domi-
nated by the U.S and the E.U.).
257. See Hon. Rohee, supra note 98, at 4-5.
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ity, especially in anti-dumping measures undertaken by devel-
oping countries and economies such as China, South Korea,
Brazil, and Mexico. 258 An increase in protectionism by develop-
ing countries, however, only followed earlier anti-dumping
measures of developed countries such as Australia, Canada, the
European Union, and the United States, who attempted to re-
strain imports from developing countries. 259
The United States is not solely responsible for an invocation
of power politics, unilateralism, and "hard" globalization into
the international trade arena. Other developed countries and
economies that possess a great deal of economic and military
material sources also play power politics. 260 Nations that pos-
sess relatively greater strength in material sources simply have
greater capability for employing power politics. The logical ex-
tension of this argument is not necessarily that less culpable na-
tions with relatively less strength in material sources are ex-
cluded. An increasing use of trade sanctions by developing
countries and economies also exacerbates problems of power
politics, unilateralism and "hard" globalization in international
trade. Genuine multilateralism depends on the interaction of
both developed and developing countries.261
Nonetheless, the United States bears a special responsibil-
ity. Important responsibilities attach to a nation such as the
United States, which possesses hegemonic power, adopts Hob-
besian multilateralism, and considers itself as "the" indispensa-
ble nation. Following the failed Cancun summit of the WTO,
the United States failed to understand the prevailing geopoliti-
cal forces and economic realities of international trade. That is,
nations are more willing to resist U.S. unipolarity and unilater-
alism. In contrast, multilateralism promotes nations more read-
258. See Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, The Political Economy of Antidumping in Japan,
6 J. OF ASIA PACIFIC ECON. 22, 22-23 (2001); WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping
Practices Semi-Annual Reports Under Article 16.4 of the Agreement, WTO Doc.
G/ADP/N/98/Add. 1/Rev.2 (Apr. 16, 2004), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen
-search.asp?searchmode=simple; World Trade Organization., WTO Secretariat Re-
ports Significant Decline in New Anti-Dumping Investigations (May 2, 2003), at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres03-e/pr339e.htm (stating that forty of the
149 initiations during the second semester of 2002 were reported by developed coun-
tries).
259. See Yoshimatsu, supra note 258, at 23.
260. See generally Beukel, supra note 60, at 6, 12, 17 (discussing that high-
income countries' tendency to demand strict environmental conditions in trade
agreements with less affluent nations is likely to be confronted by reactions against
globalization and "a need to demonstrate national identity").
261. See Hon. Rohee, supra note 98, at 5.
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ily willing to engage a unipolar United States. As a result,
when the U.S. Trade Representative signaled a continuing
commitment to a unilateralist approach in trade by announcing
that the United States would place greater emphasis on negoti-
ating bilateral treaties with "can do" nations, the "cannot do"
nations and the WTO regime were implicitly labeled as prospec-
tive future victims of U.S. unipolarity and unilateral trade poli-
cies,262 thereby reaffirming the United States's commitment to
Kaganism and unilateral trade policies.
U.S. unilateral trade policy and unilateral trade negotiation
tactics, which manifest "hard" globalization, create circum-
stances under which the legalification of the WTO regime be-
comes an effective tool for governance of global trade. These cir-
cumstances ensue because U.S. unilateral tactics undermine the
authority of the WTO regime by relegating it to a state of resid-
ual importance. In conjunction with other developed countries
and developing countries taking similar unilateral action in re-
sponse to Kagan Thesis type taxonomies, U.S. unilateral trade
policy will eventually contribute to the relegation of the WTO
regime into a legal body possessing neither legal quality nor
constituting an authoritative instrument of law, legalification
(Verrechtlichung).
CONCLUSION
The United States cannot move out of history and be at
the same time its most authentic contemporary expression.
2 3
In future relations with China, one only hopes that the
United States and other developed countries and economies will
respect the WTO DSB mechanism for resolving international
trade disputes. Using the DSB is a far better option than avoid-
ing rule of law and the jurisprudence of international trade in
262. See Bello & Kwa, supra note 209, 4. Generally, the divide between "can
do" and "cannot do" or "won't do" nations represents the divide between developed
and developing country members of the WTO, especially regarding the "Singapore
issues." See Press Release, Office of United States Trade Representative, USTR
Robert B. Zoellick, Trade Talks Collapse Over Unwillingness of Some to Negotiate
(Sept. 14, 2003), http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2003/030915epf116.htm.
263. See Mohamed Sid Ahmed, The Kagan Thesis (3)--Beyond Fukuyama and
Huntington?, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE No. 602 (Sept. 11, 2002),
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/602/op3.htm (discussing Robert Kagan's conceptu-
alization of present-day international relations).
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resolving trade disputes.264 Otherwise, true multilateralism can
only be promoted by a more "soft" globalization, rather than
"hard" globalization.
A resolution of the China-yuan-controversy is not depend-
ent on whether China justifiably or unjustifiably pegs, rather
than floats, its foreign currency rate. A resolution will also not
be based on inwardly directed theories in economics and politics,
such as domestic policies, which reflect American nationalism.
A resolution of the controversy will not turn on whether China
violated the GATT or WTO rules.2 65 An eventual resolution of
this controversy must necessarily focus on preserving and
strengthening the world trade system, by lending efficacy, not
legalification (Verrechtlichung), to the WTO Agreement. A uni-
lateral U.S. trade regime fails to avail itself of the WTO dispute
resolution mechanism and thereby lends to legalification, not ef-
ficacy, of the WTO Agreement.
For China, the United States, and other nations, growth
and prosperity is directly related to policies in international re-
lations and international trade relations, which favor multilat-
eralism. Growth is moreover linked to the exclusion of more in-
wardly directed nationalistic, domestic-centered foreign
policies. 266 The historic link between trade and foreign policy in
developed countries and economies is best evidenced by U.S.
trade policy, which is best exemplified by the Jackson-Vanik
Debate. This debate reflected legislation, which yielded to do-
mestic constituencies and lobbyists who sought trade policy and
protectionism as an answer to a struggling economy. 267 In the
Jackson-Vanik Debate, domestic constituencies and lobbyists
such as the AFL-CIO sought to influence trade policy and pro-
tectionism. Such lobby groups were also influential on March
19, 2004, when they sought to compel the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative to use Section 301 of the Trade Act for purposes of both
influencing trade policy and encouraging protectionism. 268 The
United States offered hope for multilaterism by rejecting the re-
quest of the AFL-CIO to investigate alleged violations of work-
264. For examples of the consequences of not using the DSB, see World Trade
Organization, Conference Ends Without Consensus, supra note 208, 2; Reddy, su-
pra note 251.
265. See Focus: Escalating Pressure on Yuan Revaluation, supra note 16 (dis-
cussing the U.S.'s tendency to pursue remedies outside of the WTO regime, such as
politically and economically-based coercion).
266. See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 105, at 21-22.
267. See id.
268. See Will 'Section 301'Affect Chinese Economy?, supra note 153, 1.
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ers' rights in China and currency manipulations. 269
A requisite for successful multilateral trade is a successful
WTO agenda, and a WTO Agreement that provides an effective
mechanism to govern international trade. U.S. unilateral trade
policy is not a fait accompli. The alternative to unilateralism is
multilateralism, or "[s]oftness controlling hardness." 270 Genuine
multilateralism necessitates that the United States strive for a
more emic, in conjunction with emit,271 understanding of Sinism
for purposes of promoting "soft" globalization and multilateral-
ism in both international relations and international trade rela-
tions. Empirical evidence indicating a failure in U.S. unilateral
trade negotiation tactics in countries such as China, Brazil, and
India,272 suggests that eventually, multilateralism will prevail
over unilateralism in international trade relations. This tri-
umph of multilateralism will represent "soft" globalization's in-
evitable victory over "hard" globalization. Moreover, one hopes
that in both international trade relations and in response to a
Treasury Department announcement that "serious engagement
with China on these issues will continue,"273 one will always
find, "[s]oftness controlling hardness."274
269. See Dai Yan & Hu Qihua, Officials, Analysts Hail US Trade Move, CHINA
DAILY (Apr. 30, 2004), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/englishdoc2OO4.04/3Ocontent
_327581.htm.
270. See Sun Jianyun, supra note 1.
271. See generally Alan S. Kaye, An Interview with Kenneth Pike, 35(3) CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 291, 291-298 (June 1994).
272. See Zeng, supra note 115, at 13, 20-21.
273. See 2003 REP. TO CONGRESS ON INT'L ECON. EXCH. RATE POLICIES, supra
note 86, at 8-9.
274. See Sun Jianyun, supra note 1.
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